Policy analysis for Administrative Role-Based Access Control  by Sasturkar, Amit et al.
Theoretical Computer Science 412 (2011) 6208–6234
Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
Theoretical Computer Science
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/tcs
Policy analysis for Administrative Role-Based Access Control✩
Amit Sasturkar a, Ping Yang b,∗, Scott D. Stoller c, C.R. Ramakrishnan c
a Yahoo! Inc., United States
b Department of Computer Science, Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY, 13902, United States
c Stony Brook University, United States
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 13 August 2009
Received in revised form 15 November
2010
Accepted 5 May 2011
Communicated by R. Gorrieri
a b s t r a c t
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is a widely used model for expressing access control
policies. In large organizations, the RBAC policy may be collectively managed by
many administrators. Administrative RBAC (ARBAC) models express the authority of
administrators, thereby specifying how an organization’s RBAC policy may change.
Changes by one administrator may interact in unintended ways with changes by other
administrators. Consequently, the effect of an ARBACpolicy is hard to understand by simple
inspection. In this paper, we consider the problemof analyzing ARBAC policies. Specifically,
we consider reachability properties (e.g., whether a user can eventually be assigned to a
role by a group of administrators), availability properties (e.g., whether a user cannot be
removed from a role by a group of administrators), containment properties (e.g., every
member of one role is also a member of another role) satisfied by a policy, and information
flowproperties.We show that reachability analysis for ARBAC is PSPACE-complete.We also
give algorithms and complexity results for reachability and related analysis problems for
several categories of ARBAC policies, defined by simple restrictions on the policy language.
Some of these results are based on the connection we establish between security policy
analysis and planning problems in Artificial Intelligence.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Background. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [33] is a well-known and widely used model for expressing access control
policies. At a high level, an RBAC policy specifies the roles to which each user has been assigned (the user-role assignment)
and the permissions that have been granted to each role (the permission-role assignment). Usersmay performmultiple roles
in an organization. For instance, in a university setting, a teaching assistant (TA) for a coursemay be enrolled in other courses
at the same time. That person has at least two distinct roles in the university: TA and student. Permissions are associated
with these roles; for example, a student can access only her assignments and grades, while a TA can access assignments
submitted by students in the course. Expressing access control policy using roles eases specification and management of
policies, especially in large organizations.
The RBAC policy in a large organizationmay be collectivelymanaged bymany administrators. For instance, a department
manager may have authority to determine who is a TA, while the registrar’s office determines who is a student. Thus, there
is a need to specify the authority of each administrator. Administrative RBAC’97 (ARBAC97) [32] is a model for expressing
such policies. At a high level, an ARBAC policy is specified by sets of rules, including can_assign rules that specify the roles to
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which an administratormay assign a user, and underwhat conditions, and can_revoke rules that specify the roles fromwhich
an administrator may remove a user, and under what conditions. The conditions may be positive or negative. For instance, a
can_assign rule can be used to specify that a department chair may appoint a user as a TA only if the user is already a student
and is not a research assistant. In short, an ARBAC policy defines administrative roles, and specifies how members of each
administrative role can modify the RBAC policy.
The Problem. It is often hard to understand the effect of an ARBAC policy by simple inspection. For instance, consider a
can_assign rule for a department manager that specifies that (1) only students may be appointed as TAs, and (2) a student
in a class cannot be appointed as a TA of the same class. Thus assignment of a user to the TA role is governed by both a
positive precondition (1), and a negative precondition (2). At first glance it appears as though this ensures that a student
in a class cannot be the TA for that class. However, this desired condition may not hold: the registrar’s policy for assigning
a student role in a course might check only the student’s registration status and not include conditions regarding TA-ship.
This policy would allow the registrar to add someone to a class after that person’s appointment as a TA for that class by
the department manager. This example illustrates that changes to the RBAC policy by one administrator may interact in
unintended ways with changes by other administrators. The ARBAC policy should be designed to prevent such unexpected
interactions. In large organizations with many roles (e.g., [35] describes a European bank’s policy with over 1000 roles) and
many administrative domains, understanding the ARBAC policy’s implications for such interactions may be difficult.
Analysis of security policies has been long recognized as an important problem, e.g., [15,25,30,31,34,18,26,24]. In a role-
based policy framework, a natural analysis problem is to check potential role membership. The reachability (or safety [15])
problem askswhether a given user u is amember of a given role r in any policy reachable from the initial (i.e., current) policy
by actions of a given set of administrators. The availability [24] problem asks whether a given user u is a member of a given
role r in all policies reachable from the initial policy by actions of a given set of administrators. Another natural analysis
problem is containment [24]. For example, role–role containment problem asks whether every member of a given role r1 is
also a member of a given role r2 in some (or all) reachable policies.
Contributions. We define miniARBAC, an ARBAC model based closely on ARBAC97 [32]; the main differences are that
miniARBAC allows preconditions for revocation and allows explicit specification of Static Mutually Exclusive Role (SMER)
constraints (also called static separation of duty constraints). We show that the reachability problem (abbreviated as ‘‘RE’’)
for miniARBAC is PSPACE-complete by relating it to a PSPACE-complete planning problem in Artificial Intelligence (AI). To
the best of our knowledge, ourwork is the first to study the connection between security policy analysis and thewell-studied
area of planning in AI. This complexity result motivates us to consider restrictions on the policies and two variants of the
reachability problem. Our goals are to better understand the intrinsic complexity of the problem and to identify tractable
cases of practical interest.
We consider the following restrictions on policies:
1. N: no negative preconditions.
2. EN: no explicit negative preconditions; negative preconditions for role assignment may occur only in the form of
Static Mutually Exclusive Role (SMER) constraints [27] (sometimes called separation of duty constraints), each of which
specifies that a user cannot simultaneously be a member of two given roles;
3. CR: every role can be revoked unconditionally; and
4. D: disjunction is not used in the policy’s overall conditions for assignment or revocation of a role. The precondition in a
single rule never contains explicit disjunction, so this restriction actually requires that there is at most one assignment
rule and one revocation rule per role.
We expect thatmost ARBAC policies satisfy one of these restrictions on negation.Moreover, while role assignments typically
have preconditions, role revocations typically do not, and considering unconditional revocation of all roles is sufficient
for analysis of policies designed primarily to ensure safety (as opposed to availability). The restriction on disjunction is
motivated by results for AI planning that show that this restriction (called post-uniqueness in the planning literature), in
combination with other restrictions, can reduce the complexity of planning [5,7].
We also consider two variants of the Reachability problem. One is Bounded Reachability (BRE): is the goal of adding the
given user to the given role reachable using at most a given number of administrative operations? The other is Existence of
a Polynomial-size Plan (EPP) for a class of policies: is every reachable goal reachable using a sequence of operations whose
length is polynomial in the size of the policy? We consider these variants of reachability analysis primarily to shine some
indirect light on the difficulty of reachability analysis for problem classes for which the complexity of reachability analysis
itself is unknown.
Restricting attention to plans or paths of bounded length is a common idea in bounded-length planning and bounded
model checking [3]. Generally, the bounded version of the problem is not of intrinsic interest, but it provides a way to
partially or indirectly attack the original (unbounded) problem when the latter is too difficult. This is the case in our work
as well. We establish complexity results for BRE for some problem classes for which there are no known complexity results
for reachability.
Existence of a polynomial-size plan is a natural property to consider. In addition to the intuitive connection that
reachability is easier when the plans are shorter (and the plans, regarded as potential attacks, are more practical), some
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specific complexity results for reachability follow from complexity results for EPP. In particular, if EPP for a problem class
is true, then Reachability (i.e., the reachability decision problem) for that problem class is in NP; and if EPP is false for a
problem class, then the plan generation problem for that problem class is not in P.
We explore the complexity of reachability analysis, the above variants of it (BRE and EPP), and availability analysis under
combinations of these restrictions on policies. Some of our results are corollaries of existing results for AI planning, butmost
of our results are new. In many cases, the restricted analysis problem still has high computational complexity. Perhaps the
most revealing of these results is the non-existence of polynomial-size plans for a number of classes of ARBAC policies. This
reflects the difficulty of understanding the implications of ARBAC policies.
In summary, the main contributions of this paper are to:
• establish that reachability analysis for general miniARBAC policies is PSPACE-complete;
• determine the computational complexity of user-role reachability analysis and the above variants of it (namely, BRE and
EPP) for several categories of miniARBAC policies;
• give algorithms for cases where the analysis problem is solvable in polynomial time;
• give algorithms and complexity results for several other analysis problems, including permission-role reachability, user-
permission reachability, availability, role–role containment, permission-role containment, and information flowanalysis.
• give complexity result for reachability analysis of a variant of miniARBAC that does not require disjointness of
administrative roles and regular roles.
Sections 2 and 3 provide an overview of RBAC and ARBAC policies. Sections 4, 5 and 7 formally define the analysis
problems and provide algorithms and complexity results for user-role reachability analysis. Other analysis problems are
considered in Section 6. The related work and concluding remarks appear in Sections 8 and 9, respectively.
2. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
The central notion of RBAC is that users are assigned to appropriate roles and roles are assigned appropriate permissions.
Thus, a role serves as an intermediary in correlating users with permissions. In this paper, we study policy analysis only
for models of RBAC based on [2]. Since the policy analysis queries we support are independent of sessions, we consider
simplified (‘‘mini’’) models that do not support sessions.
The miniRBAC model is based on the core RBAC model [2].
Definition 1 (miniRBAC). AminiRBAC policy γ is a tuple (U, R, P,UA, PA)where
• U , R and P are finite sets of users, roles, and permissions, respectively. A permission represents authorization to invoke
a particular operation on a particular resource.
• UA ⊆ U × R is the user-role assignment relation. (u, r) ∈ UAmeans that user u is a member of role r .
• PA ⊆ P × R is the permission-role assignment relation. (p, r) ∈ PA means that members of role r are granted the
permission p.
Given γ = (U, P, R,UA, PA), define usersγ (r) = {u ∈ U : (u, r) ∈ UA} and permsγ (r) = {p ∈ P : (p, r) ∈ PA}.
Our miniHRBAC model, based on Hierarchical RBAC [2], extends miniRBAC with role hierarchies, which are a natural
means for structuring roles to reflect an organization’s lines of authority and responsibility.
Definition 2 (miniHRBAC). AminiHRBAC policy γh is a tuple (U, R, P,UA, PA,≽)where
• U , R, P , UA and PA are as in miniRBAC.
• ≽ ⊆ R× R is a partial order, called the role hierarchy.
r1 ≽ r2 means r1 is senior to r2; i.e., every member of r1 is also a member of r2, and every permission assigned to r2 is
also available to members of r1. Thus, r2 inherits all the users of r1, and r1 inherits all the permissions of r2.
Given γh = (U, P, R,UA, PA,≽), we extend the usersγ and permsγ functions to account for role hierarchy: usersγh(r) ={u ∈ U : ∃r ′ ∈ R.r ′ ≽ r ∧ (u, r ′) ∈ UA}, and permsγh(r) = {p ∈ P : ∃r ′ ∈ R.r ≽ r ′ ∧ (p, r ′) ∈ PA}. We define
Senior(r) = {r ′ ∈ R : r ′ ≽ r}.
Fig. 1 gives a simple example of a miniRBAC and a miniHRBAC policy with 8 roles. Consider the roles Univ-Member,
Univ-Employee, and Student. The permissions for each role are shown below the role. Users in the Univ-Member role
are members of the University and have permission to use University facilities like the gym. The roles Univ-Employee
and Student are senior to the Univ-Member role. Thus, members of these roles are also implicitly members of the
Univ-Member role, and inherit the permission to use the gym.
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Fig. 1. Example of miniRBAC and miniHRBAC policy.
3. Administrative Role-Based Access Control (ARBAC)
Administration of (i.e., changes to) RBAC policies must be carefully controlled. RBAC policies for large organizations may
have over a thousand roles and tens of thousands of users. For scalability, it is necessary to distribute the task of administering
such large policies, by giving each administrator authority tomake specified kinds of changes to specified parts of the policy.
This is an access control policy that, for scalability and ease of administration, can profitably be expressed in a role-based
manner.
ARBAC97 (‘‘Administrative RBAC’’) is a model for decentralized administration of RBAC policies [32]. Changes to the
ARBAC policy (e.g., granting permissions to administrative roles) are not considered in the ARBAC97 model. This is justified
by assuming that only a small group of fully trusted administrators are allowed to modify the ARBAC policy.
In typical ARBAC policies, there is a single top-level administrator role, called the Senior Security Officer (SSO) which is
the principal administrator of the RBAC policy andwhich establishes the ARBAC policy. The SSO partitions the organization’s
RBAC policy into different security domains, each of which is administered by a different Junior Security Officer (JSO). For
example, there may be a JSO role for each department. The ARBAC policy specifies the permissions assigned to each JSO
role; for example, to which normal roles and under what conditions canmembers of a JSO role assign users. SSOs can design
ARBAC policies that enforce global constraints on the RBAC policy by allowing JSOs tomake only changes that are consistent
with the constraints.
There are three main parts in an ARBAC97 policy: the user-role administration (URA) policy, the permission-role ad-
ministration (PRA) policy, and the role–role administration (RRA) policy. They control changes to the user-role assignment
UA, the permission-role assignment PA, and the role hierarchy respectively. In this paper, we consider a slightly modified
version of ARBAC97, which we call miniARBAC. A miniARBAC policy consists of URA, PRA, and RRA policies, defined below.
URA policy. The URA policy controls changes to the user-role assignment UA. Its specification uses preconditions (called
prerequisite conditions in [32]) which are conjunctions of literals, where each literal is either r or¬r for some role r . Given
a miniRBAC state γ and a user u, u satisfies a precondition ∧ili, denoted u |=γ ∧ili, iff for all i, either li is a role r and
u ∈ usersγ (r), or li is a negated role ¬r and u /∈ usersγ (r).
Permission to assign users to roles is specified by the can_assign ⊆ AR × C × R relation, where AR is a finite set of
administrative roles and C is the set of all preconditions on R. ARBAC97 requires that AR ∩ R = ∅. A UserAssign(ra, u, r)
action specifies that an administrator who is a member of the administrative role ra adds user u to role r . This action is
enabled in state γ = (U, P, R,UA, PA) iff there exists (ra, c, r) ∈ can_assign and u |=γ c . Upon executing the action, γ
is transformed to the state γ ′ = (U, P, R,UA ∪ {(u, r)}, PA). Note that preconditions are not invariants; if (ra, r1, r2) ∈
can_assign, then a user u in r1 and r2 remains a member of r2 even if an administrator removes u from r1. If some role r does
not appear in the last component of any tuple in can_assign, then no administrator can add users to r , but r could still appear
in the initial role assignment.
Permission to revoke users from roles is specified by the can_revoke⊆ AR× C × R relation, where AR and C are as above.
[32] mentions the option of including preconditions in can_revoke but does not include them in the basic ARBAC97 model.A
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UserRevoke(ra, u, r) action specifies that an administrator who is a member of the administrative role ra removes user u
from the membership of role r . This action is enabled in state γ = (U, P, R,UA, PA) iff there exists (ra, c, r) ∈ can_revoke
and u |=γ c. Upon executing the action, γ is transformed to the state γ ′ = (U, P, R,UA \ {(u, r)}, PA).
PRA policy. The PRA policy controls changes to the permission-role assignment PA. Assignment of a permission p to a
role r by an administrator in administrative role ra is achieved by the PermAssign(ra, p, r) action and is controlled by the
can_assign_p relation. Similarly, revocation of a permission p from a role r by an administrator in administrative role ra is
achieved by the PermRevoke(ra, p, r) action and is controlled by the can_revoke_p relation. These relations are defined in the
same way as the can_assign and can_revoke relations above, except that users are replaced with permissions.
RRA policy. The RRA policy controls changes to the role hierarchy. Actions that modify the role hierarchy include
CreateRole(r, rp, rc), which creates a new role r with parent rp and child rc (the parent and child must be existing roles),
DeleteRole(r), which deletes role r , InsertEdge(r1, r2), which inserts an edge from r1 to r2 (i.e., makes r1 senior to r2), and
DeleteEdge(r1, r2), which deletes the edge from r1 to r2. Permissions to execute these actions are controlled by the can_modify
⊆ AR × 2R relation. The subsets of R are specified using range notation, similar to standard mathematical notation for nu-
meric ranges. A role range has the form (r1, r2), (r1, r2], [r1, r2), or [r1, r2], where r2 ≽ r1. A parenthesis indicates that the
endpoint is not included in the range; a square bracket indicates that the endpoint is included in the range. For example,
[r1, r2) denotes the {r ∈ R | r2 ≻ r ≽ r1}, where r1 ≻ r2 = r1 ≽ r2 ∧ r1 ≠ r2. For an administrative role ra and role range
Y of the form (r1, r2), (ra, Y ) ∈ can_modify specifies that members of ra can perform CreateRole(r, rp, rc), DeleteRole(r),
InsertEdge(r1, r2), and DeleteEdge(r1, r2) provided that r , rp, rc , r1, and r2 are in Y and that some additional restrictions hold
that ensure the changes to the role hierarchy are sensible and safe; for example, deletion of roles that are referenced ex-
plicitly in relations in URA, PRA, or RRA (e.g., roles that appear in preconditions in can_assign) is prohibited. We adopt these
restrictions but omit details of them, because they do not affect our results. Note that the RRA policy makes sense only in
the presence of role hierarchy, i.e., when we are considering changes to miniHRBAC policies not miniRBAC policies.
Static Mutually Exclusive Role (SMER) constraints.miniARBAC also includes a set of 1-2 SMER constraints [27] which are
used to enforce separation of duty [11]. SMER constraints are called Static Separation of Duty (SSoD) constraints in [2]; we
follow [27] in referring to them as SMER constraints. A 1-2 SMER constraint is an unordered pair of roles s = {r1, r2} and is
satisfied in a state γ , denoted γ ⊢ s, iff users(r1) ∩ users(r2) = ∅; i.e., the roles r1 and r2 do not have any users in common
in the RBAC policy γ . γ is said to be valid for a set of SMER constraints S iff ∀s ∈ S : γ ⊢ s. SMER constraints specifying
disjointness of permissions assigned to two roles could also be allowed, but it is unclear whether such constraints would be
useful in practice.
Note that a SMER constraint {r1, r2} can be expressed by including ¬r1 in the precondition of all can_assign rules for r2
and roles senior to r2, and vice versa. We choose to explicitly represent SMER constraints (and not force them to be specified
in the URA model using negation), because this allows us to investigate whether policy analysis is easier if negation is used
only in the form of SMER constraints, which is a common case.
Definition 3 (miniARBAC). AminiARBAC policy is a tupleψ = (AR, ≽a, can_assign, can_revoke, can_assign_p, can_revoke_p,
can_modify, SMER), where AR is the set of administrative roles, the administrative role hierarchy≽a is a partial order on AR,
and the other five relations are as defined above.
In summary, the differences between miniARBAC and ARBAC97, aside from notation, are that, in miniARBAC: (1)
can_revoke and can_revoke_p are extended to allow preconditions for revocation, (2) SMER constraints can be explicitly
specified, and (3) the last component of can_assign, can_revoke, can_assign_p, and can_revoke_p is a single role, instead of a
role range.
A miniARBAC policy specifies a transition relation between miniRBAC policies, which we refer to as ‘‘states’’. We denote
a transition by γ
act→ψ γ ′ where act is one of the administrative actions specified above (namely, UserAssign, UserRevoke,
PermAssign, PermRevoke, CreateRole, DeleteRole, InsertEdge, or DeleteEdge), and γ and γ ′ satisfy the SMER constraints in ψ .
Examples.We present a few example miniARBAC policies that illustrate features of miniARBAC. Consider the miniHRBAC
policy of Fig. 1.
• Positive preconditions: A user can be made member of the Teaching-Assistant (TA) role by an administrator in
role ra only if she is already a member of the Student role. This policy can be specified by the rule (ra, Student, TA) ∈
can_assign.
• Conjunction in preconditions: A user who is a member of both Faculty and FullTime-Employee roles can serve
on the Promotion-Committee. This policy can be specified by the rule (ra, Faculty ∧ FullTime-Employee,
Promotion-Committee) ∈ can_assign, where ra is an appropriate administrative role.
• 1-2 SMER constraints: A user can be a member of at most one of the Faculty and Student roles. This policy can be
specified by the constraint set SMER = {{Faculty, Student}}.
• Negative preconditions:Negative preconditions in the can_revoke relation can be used to force role revocations to occur
in a particular order. Wemight have a policy that says that a user can bemademember of the TA role only if he is already
a member of the Student role. The policy also requires that when a user ceases to be a Student he also ceases to be
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a TA. This policy can be enforced with the following rules : (ra, Student, TA) ∈ can_assign, and (ra,¬TA, Student) ∈
can_revoke. The second rule forces an administrator to revoke the user’s TA role before revoking his Student role.
• Conditional role revocation: Recall that miniARBAC, unlike ARBAC97 [32], allows preconditions in role revocation.
The policy with negative preconditions described above is also an example of a policy that requires conditional role
revocation.
4. Policy analysis problems
A miniARBAC policyψ defines a transition relation between miniRBAC policies and therefore defines a transition graph.
Each vertex of the transition graph is a miniRBAC policy, and each edge is a transition γ
act→ψ γ ′. Usually we are interested
in analyzing or restricting the power of a given set A of administrative roles, so we discard edges labeled with actions by
administrative roles not in A (recall that the administrative role is the first argument of every action), and ask the following
kinds of queries about the resulting graph. Note that A is an implicit parameter of all these queries.
• User-Role Reachability Analysis: Given a role r and a user u not in r , can u be added to r (by actions of administrators
in administrative roles in A)?
• Permission-Role Reachability Analysis: Given a role r and a permission p not granted to r , can p be granted to r?
• User-Permission Reachability Analysis: Given a user u and a permission p, does there exist a role r such that p can be
granted to r and u can be added to r (i.e., p is granted to u)? (If these two administrative operations can be done at all, they
can be done simultaneously, because miniARBAC does not include any constraints that relate the user-role assignment
and the permission-role assignment.)
• User-Role Availability Analysis [24]: Given a role r and a member u of r , can u be removed from r ?
• Permission-Role Availability Analysis [24]: Given a role r and a permission p granted to r , can p be revoked from r?
• Role–Role Containment Analysis: Given two roles r1 and r2, are the members of r1 always (i.e., in the policy at every
node) a subset of the members of r2• Permission-Role Containment Analysis: Given two roles r1 and r2, are the permissions of r1 a subset of the permissions
of r2 ?
4.1. Simplifying the problem
These analysis problems can be simplified by eliminating irrelevant aspects of the RBAC and ARBAC policies. This reduces
clutter but does not change the algorithmic complexity of the problem. This section details our simplifications for user-role
reachability analysis without role hierarchy (i.e., for miniARBAC controlling changes to miniRBAC policies, not miniHRBAC
policies). Similar simplifications are possible for other analysis problems.
A user-role reachability query Q has the form: Given a user u, a set A of administrative roles, a set goal of roles, an initial
miniRBAC policy γ , and a miniARBAC policy ψ , can administrators in administrative roles in A, using the administrative
permissions granted to those roles by ψ , transform γ to another policy γ ′ such that u is a member of all roles in goal in γ ′?
We simplify the problem as follows.
1. Ignoring permissions: miniARBAC does not include any constraints that relate the user-role assignment and the
permission-role assignment, so the answer to Q is affected only by the user-role assignment relation and the can_assign,
can_revoke and SMER components of ψ . The other components of γ and ψ can be ignored when answering Q . This also
implies that only the UserAssign and UserRevoke actions are relevant.
2. Implicit administrative role: Administrative roles not in A are assumed to be inactive while administrators in
administrative roles in A are trying to reach the goal. Thus, administrative roles not in A have no effect on the answer to
Q , so we can remove from ψ every administrative role that is not in A and is not junior to an administrative role in A.
We also remove all can_assign and can_revoke rules for the removed administrative roles. Then Q asks about reachability
under actions by all of the (remaining) administrative roles. Thus, there is no need to distinguish these roles from each
other, so we can delete their names. In other words, we can assume that there is a single implicit administrative role, and
we simplify can_assign and can_revoke to have the type C × R (instead of AR× C × R).
3. Single user: The preconditions for UserAssign(ra, u, r) and UserRevoke(ra, u, r) depend only on the current role
memberships of the target user u. These conditions are independent of the role memberships of other users. Therefore,
when answering a query Q about user u, we can remove all other users from the policy. Thus, we can assume there is a
single implicit user, and we can simplify UA to be a subset of R, where r ∈ UAmeans that the implicit user is a member
of r .
With these simplifications, a (simplified) miniRBAC policy γ is a pair (R,UA) where UA ⊆ R, an action is UserAssign(r)
or UserRevoke(r), and a (simplified) miniARBAC policy ψ is a triple (can_assign, can_revoke, SMER) where can_assign,
can_revoke ⊆ C × R. Note that can_modify is omitted because we are not considering role hierarchy. A reachability query
for the simplified policy can be represented as a set goal of roles (since u and A are now implicit). A goal set goal is satisfied
in an RBAC policy state γ = (R,UA), denoted γ ⊢ goal, iff goal ⊆ UA.
Definition 4 (Reachability Analysis Problem Instance). A (simplified) user-role reachability analysis problem instance is a 3-
tuple I = (γ , goal, ψ)where γ is a miniRBAC policy, ψ is a miniARBAC policy, and goal ⊆ R is a goal set.
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Given a reachability analysis problem instance, one natural question is whether an RBAC policy state satisfying the goal
can be reached starting from the initial state of the instance. A closely related problem is to find a sequence of RBAC policy
changes that lead to a state satisfying the goal. Such a sequence of changes is called a plan, defined formally below.
Definition 5 (Plan). Let I = (γ , goal, ψ) be a reachability analysis problem instance. A sequence of actions act1, act2,
. . . , actn where each acti ∈ {UserAssign(r),UserRevoke(r) : r ∈ R} is called a plan or solution for I if γ act1→ψ · · · actn→ψ γ ′
and γ ′ ⊢ goal. The length of the plan is the length of the sequence.
The reachability problem can be expressed in terms of plan existence:
Definition 6 (Reachability (RE)). Given a problem instance I , the Reachability Problem (RE) is to determine whether or not
there exists a plan for I .
Note that we allow the goal to be a set of roles. It might seem sufficient to take the goal to be a single role, because
reachability of a goal {g1, . . . , gn} can be reduced to reachability of a goal containing a single role g by adding (g1∧· · ·∧gn, g)
to the can_assign relation. However, this transformation cannot always be used, because it adds a can_assign rule with
multiple positive preconditions to the policy, and some of our results in Section 5 depend on restrictions on the number
of preconditions or the number of positive preconditions in each rule. Also note that the approach of separately checking
reachability of g1, . . . , gn does not work, because even if these roles are reachable individually, they might not be reachable
simultaneously, e.g., if two of them are involved in a SMER constraint.
The Reachability problem is PSPACE-complete in general, as shown below in Section 5. To understand the problem better
and identify efficiently solvable cases of practical interest, we consider several subclasses of problem instances by imposing
various structural restrictions on theminiARBACpolicy and the query. For several of these classes,we can tightly characterize
the complexity of the Reachability problem. However, there remain a number of classes for which the precise complexity of
the problem remains unknown. For such classes, it is interesting to consider a variant of the problem, known as the Bounded
Reachability problem, defined below.
Definition 7 (Bounded Reachability (BRE)). Given a problem instance I and an integer k, the Bounded Reachability Problem
(BRE) is to determine whether or not there exists a plan for I of length at most k.
Note that BRE might be harder than RE for some problem classes—intuitively, this is because finding a short plan might
be more difficult than finding an arbitrary plan. Below, we show that RE is no harder than BRE:
Lemma 1. For any problem class, BRE is at least as hard as RE.
Proof Sketch: The proof is by reduction from BRE to RE. Let I be a problem instance of RE. We construct an instance I , k of
BRE by choosing a bound k such that there is a plan for I iff there is a plan of length ≤k for I . Let |R| be the number of roles
in I . It suffices to choose k to be 2|R| because this is an upper bound on the number of reachable states. It is easy to see that
there is a plan for I iff there is a plan for I that goes through each state at most once. O(|R|) bits are needed to represent this
value of kwhich is linear in the number of bits in the representation of I . 
When the complexity of BRE and RE are not knownwith sufficient precision, we can characterize the difficulty of problem
instances by considering the lengths of plans for them.
Definition 8 (Existence of Polynomial-size Plan (EPP)). Given a set S of problem instances, we say that S has the property of
existence of a polynomial-size plan (equivalently, we say that EPP is true for S) if and only if there is a polynomial f such
that for all problem instances I ∈ S, if I has a plan, then I has a plan with length at most f (|I|).
Definition 9 (Size of a Problem Instance). The size |I| of a problem instance I is the sum of the sizes of all the sets in it.
When EPP is false for a problem instance in a class C, the plan-generation problem for C is not in P (i.e., not solvable
in polynomial time). Note that RE for C may still be solvable in polynomial time, because RE is a decision problem which
does not require explicit generation of a plan. When EPP is true for a problem class C, then RE for C is in NP, because a
non-deterministic Turing machine can guess the plan and verify it in polynomial time.
4.2. Classification of problem instances
Due to the intractability of reachability analysis for ARBAC in the general case, we consider a variety of restrictions on
reachability problem instances. This section defines those restrictions.
We consider four categories of restrictions on ψ . The acronyms for them are summarized in Fig. 2.
• Restricting negation:We say that ψ uses explicit negation if a negative literal appears in can_assign or can_revoke, and
ψ uses implicit negation if ψ contains a SMER constraint (i.e., SMER ≠ ∅).
– No negation (N): ψ satisfies the N restriction if ψ does not use explicit or implicit negation.
– No explicit negation (EN): ψ satisfies the EN restriction if ψ does not use explicit negation. This restriction is
interesting because SMER constraints are more common than other uses of negation.
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Fig. 2. Complexity of Reachability Analysis.
• Nodisjunction (D):ψ satisfies theD restriction if for every role r ∈ R, there is atmost one rule inψ for assigning/revoking
r .
• Restricting revocation:
– No revocation (R): ψ satisfies the R restriction if can_revoke = ∅. This implies that once a user is assigned to a role,
the user cannot be revoked from the role.
– No conditional revocation (CR): ψ satisfies the CR restriction if for every role r ∈ R, (true, r) ∈ can_revoke.
In other words, every role in R can be unconditionally revoked. This restriction is reasonable, especially when
considering powerful administrative roles, because revocation is generally not controlled as tightly as role assignment,
for example, recall that ARBAC97 does not support preconditions on revocation.
• Size restrictions: ψ satisfies |pre| ≤ k if ∀(c, r) ∈ can_revoke, the number of literals in c is bounded by k and ∀(c, r) ∈
can_assign, the number of literals in c is bounded by k − |{r ′ : {r, r ′} ∈ SMER}| (if {r1, r2} is a SMER constraint, then
¬r1 is counted as part of every precondition for r2 in can_assign, and vice versa). ψ satisfies |ppre| ≤ k if ∀(c, r) ∈
can_assign ∪ can_revoke, the number of positive literals in c is bounded by k. ψ satisfies |SMER(r)| ≤ k if ∀r ∈ R,
|{r ′ : {r, r ′} ∈ SMER}| ≤ k.ψ satisfies |goal| ≤ k if the size of the goal set is at most k (thus, for a set of problem instances
satisfying |goal| ≤ k, the size of every goal is bounded by k, independent of the number of roles in each problem instance).
As we show below, enforcing one or more of these restrictions greatly simplifies the reachability analysis problem.
We also consider a restriction EI (empty initial state) on problem instances. A problem instance (γ , goal, ψ) satisfies EI
if the user assignment in γ is the empty set.
A set of restrictions defines a class of reachability analysis problems. For example, the class [R,D, |pre| ≤ 1] includes
all problems (γ , goal, ψ) where ψ satisfies the R, D and |pre| ≤ 1 restrictions. When a class has the EN restriction (allow
SMER constraints, but not explicit negation), the |ppre| ≤ k restriction is used instead of the |pre| ≤ k restriction, since
preconditions contain only positive literals. For each class we consider the RE and BRE problems and check whether EPP is
true for every problem instance in the class.
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5. Complexity results for user-role reachability analysis without role hierarchy
Fig. 2 summarizes our complexity results for user-role reachability analysis without role hierarchy (role hierarchy is
considered in Section 7.1). The problem classes, represented by boxes, are divided into four groups, separated by double
lines, based on the complexity of RE and BRE. The problem classes are arranged in a hierarchy. An edge from class C1 to C2
indicates that C2 is a specialization of C1. Thus, every hardness result for C2 also applies to C1, and every algorithm for C1
can be used to solve C2. When multiple top-level problem classes contain the same restriction, the figure emphasizes this
structure using an ellipse representing the restriction with edges to those problem classes. Different line styles are used for
outgoing edges of different ellipses, just to increase the visual distinction between them. The notation Th⟨n⟩means that the
result is proved in Theorem n; for example, Th9 refers to Theorem 9.
Some observations follow.
1. The restriction |goal| ≤ k is relevant only in classes that also have the restriction |pre| ≤ 1. If a problem class C has the
former restriction but not the latter, then given a problem instance I = (γ , goal, ψ) with |goal| > k, we can rewrite I
to an instance I ′ = (γ ′, goal′, ψ ′) with |goal′| = 1, by introducing new roles in γ and adding rules to ψ for modifying
them. For example, if goal = {r1, r2} and C has the restriction |goal| ≤ 1 but not the restriction |pre| ≤ 1, then introduce
a new role rg , add the rule (r1 ∧ r2, rg) to can_assign, and take goal′ = {rg}. The new problem instance is equivalent to
the old instance but satisfies |goal| ≤ 1 and is still in C.
2. The restriction D (no disjunction) makes the Reachability problem easier; Reachability for [R] is NP-complete whereas for
[D, R] it is solvable in polynomial time. Not allowing disjunction in preconditions reduces the number of possible plans
for a problem instance, thereby reducing the complexity of the Reachability problem.
3. The restriction CR (only unconditional revocation) affects what we can say about the Existence of Polynomial-size Plan
(EPP) problem. EPP for [D, EN, |ppre| ≤ 1, |goal| ≤ k] is false and hence for [EN, |ppre| ≤ 1, |goal| ≤ k] is
false, implying that a polynomial-time algorithm for generating a plan for this problem class does not exist. EPP for
[CR, EN, |ppre| ≤ 1, |goal| ≤ k] is true.
4. The restriction R (no revocation) ensures that the answer to the Existence of Polynomial-size Plan (EPP) problem is true.
When role revocation is not allowed, the user can be assigned to a role at most once in any plan. Thus, the length of a
plan is at most the number of roles.
5. For most problem classes (i.e., sets of restrictions) we considered, adding the EN restriction (allow SMER constraints but
not explicit negation) neither lowered the worst-case complexity of RE or BRE nor changed EPP from false to true.
Thus, in general, SMER constraints do not seem to be easier to analyze than explicit use of negation. Intuitively, this may
reflect the fact that when negation is allowed, even in restricted forms, the analysis problem loses its monotonic nature.
However, there are problem classes for which the effect of adding or removing the EN restriction remains unknown.
For example, we showed that RE is solvable in polynomial time for the class [CR, EN, |ppre| ≤ 1, |goal| ≤ k], but the
worst-case complexity of RE for the class [CR, |ppre| ≤ 1, |goal| ≤ k] is unknown.
The proof of Theorem 6 provides a polynomial-time algorithm for solving Reachability (RE) for a problem class that is still
general enough to be interesting in practice. Theorems 19 and 29 show that even when three or four restrictions are applied
simultaneously, reachability may remain a hard problem, not solvable in polynomial time.
The rest of this section contains proofs for the results in Fig. 2. Section 5.1 contains proofs for PSPACE-completeness
results. Section 5.2 contains proofs and algorithms for problem classes forwhich user-role reachability analysis can be solved
in polynomial time. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 present proofs for problem classes for which user-role reachability analysis is NP-
complete and NP-hard, respectively.
Reachability has been studied in a variety of settings, such as static program analysis and model checking, as well as
planning. However, work on propositional planning in AI is particularly relevant to ARBAC policy analysis, because operators
considered in planning are similar to RBAC administrative operations. As a result, some complexity results for ARBAC policy
analysis, such as Theorems 5 and 14 below, can be derived in a fairly direct way from results for planning, by reductions
from planning to policy analysis and vice versa.
5.1. Proofs for PSPACE-completeness of reachability analysis
Theorem 2 is based on complexity results for SAS+ planning described in [7]. Below, we describe the SAS+ planning
model of [7].
Definition 10. An instance of the SAS+ planning problem is given by the tupleΠ = (V,O, s0, s∗)with components defined
as follows.
• V = {v1, v2, . . . , vm} is a set of state variables. Each variable v has an associated domain Dv , which implicitly
defines an extended domain D+v = Dv ∪ {u} where u denotes the undefined value. Further, the total state space
S = Dv1 × Dv2 × · · · × Dvm and the partial state space S+ = D+v1 × D+v2 × · · · × D+vm are implicitly defined. We write s[v]
to denote the value of variable v in state s.
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• O is a set of operators of the form (pre, post, prv)where pre, post, prv ∈ S+ denote the pre, post, and prevail conditions,
respectively. Prevail conditions of an operator o are preconditions of o that remain unchanged by the execution of o.
Operators are subject to the following restrictions: for every operator (pre, post, prv) in O,
(R1) ∀v ∈ V : pre[v] ≠ u → pre[v] ≠ post[v] ≠ u.
(R2) ∀v ∈ V : post[v] = u or prv[v] = u.
• s0 ∈ S+V and s∗ ∈ S+V denote the initial and goal states respectively.
Restriction R1 says that a state variable can never become undefined once it has been defined by some operator.
Restriction R2 says that the prevail condition of an operator must never define the variable being modified by the operator.
If o = (pre, post, prv) is an operator, we write pre(o) to denote pre, etc.
A plan is a sequence of operators inO. Let α.o denote the sequence α extendedwith element o. The state result(s, α) that
results from executing plan α from state s is defined recursively by
result(s, ⟨⟩) = s
result(s, α.o) =

result(s, α)⊕ post(o) if (pre(o) ⊔ prv(o)) ⊑ result(s, α)
s otherwise (this is an arbitrary choice)
where s⊕ t (state s updated by state t) is defined by
(s⊕ t)[v] =

t[v] if t[v] ≠ u
s[v] otherwise
and s ⊔ t (join of s and t) is defined by
(s ⊔ t)[v] =
s[v] if t[v] = u
t[v] if s[v] = u
undefined otherwise
and s ⊑ t (state s is subsumed by state t) is defined by s ⊑ t = (∀v ∈ V. s[v] = u ∨ s[v] = t[v]).
An operator o is admissible in a state s iff (pre(o) ⊔ prv(o)) ⊑ s. A plan α = ⟨o1, . . . , on⟩ is admissible in state s iff either
α is empty or ok is admissible in result(s, ⟨o1, . . . , ok−1⟩) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
Definition 11. The plan existence problem for SAS+ planning is to determine, given a problem instanceΠ = (V,O, s0, s∗),
whether there exists a plan α such that α is admissible in s0 and s∗ ⊑ result(s0, α).
A SAS+ planning instanceΠ = (V,O, s0, s∗) satisfies the
• Binary (B) restriction iff for all v ∈ V , |Dv| = 2. Thus, every variable is boolean variable under the B restriction.
• Unary (U) restriction iff for all operators o ∈ O, post(o)[v] ≠ u for exactly one v ∈ V . Thus, an operator can change the
state of a single variable under the U restriction.
Theorem 2. Reachability (RE) and Bounded Reachability (BRE) for the problem class without any restrictions are PSPACE-
complete.
Proof. [7] shows that plan existence for SAS+ planning under the U and B restrictions is PSPACE-complete. Informally, the
U restriction requires actions to have a single effect and the B restriction requires the effects of every action to be binary.
The actions that we consider here – UserAssign(r) and UserRevoke(r) – are binary actions that have a single effect, since they
either add the user to r or revoke the user from r . We can encode plan existence for a SAS+ planning problem instance that
satisfies the U and B restrictions as a miniARBAC Reachability problem instance. This establishes that solving Reachability for
unrestricted miniARBAC policies is PSPACE-hard. By Lemma 1, BRE is at least as hard as RE, so BRE is also PSPACE-hard.
RE and BRE for unrestricted ARBAC policies are in NPSPACE, because a non-deterministic TuringMachine can guess a plan
one step at a time, storing at each step only the current state (i.e., current miniRBAC policy), whose size is polynomial in the
size of the problem instance. These problems are therefore also in PSPACE, because Savitch’s Theorem implies NPSPACE=
PSPACE. Thus, RE and BRE for unrestricted ARBAC policies are PSPACE-complete. 
5.2. Proofs for polynomial-time reachability analysis
Lemma 3. Let I = (γ , ψ, goal) be a reachability analysis problem instance where γ = (R,UA) and ψ = (can_assign,
can_revoke, SMER). If can_revoke= ∅ then if I has a plan, I has a plan of length at most |R|.
Proof. Since there is no revocation, a plan for I contains only role assignment actions. It is not useful for a plan to assign
the user to the same role multiple times. More precisely, for each role to which the user is assigned by the plan, keep the
first assignment of the user to that role and delete subsequent assignments (if any) of the user to that role. The length of the
resulting plan is bounded by |R|. 
Theorem 4. RE for the problem class [N] can be solved in polynomial time. In addition, EPP for [N] is true.
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Proof. Let I = (γ , ψ, goal) be a reachability analysis problem instance in the problem class [N] where γ = (R,UA) and
ψ = (can_assign, can_revoke, SMER). Then, SMER = ∅. Since the preconditions in can_assign do not contain ¬, revoking a
role does not help satisfy any precondition, so we can assume can_revoke = ∅ for reachability analysis. From Lemma 3 it
follows that if I has a plan, then I has a plan of length at most |R|. Thus, EPP for the problem class [N] is true.
RE for this problem class can be solved by a simple fixed-point algorithm. The algorithm computes the set S of all
reachable roles by starting with S equal to the initial state UA and repeatedly adding roles to S using any tuple in can_assign
whose precondition is satisfied by S. It is easy to see that this algorithm takes polynomial time.
Li and Tripunitara proved a very similar result, namely, that simple safety analysis for the Assignment and Trusted Users
(AATU) problem class is solvable in polynomial time [26]. That result makes the additional assumption that all roles that can
be assigned can be unconditionally revoked (similar to our CR restriction). 
We recall the definition of STRIPS planning and the PLANSAT decision problem [8], and then prove the next theorem by
reduction to PLANSAT.
Definition 12 (Propositional STRIPS Planning [8]). An instance of propositional STRIPS planning is specified by a tuple
(P ,O, I,G)where:
• P is a finite set of ground atomic formulas, called conditions.
• O is a finite set of operators, where each operator o has the form Pre ⇒ Post
– Pre is a satisfiable conjunction of positive and negative conditions, respectively called the positive preconditions o+
and the negative preconditions o− of the operator.
– Post is a satisfiable conjunction of positive and negative conditions, respectively called the positive postconditions o+
and the negative postconditions o− of the operator.
• I ⊆ P is the initial state.
• G is a satisfiable conjunction of positive and negative goals, respectively called the positive goals G+ and the negative
goals G−.
A state S is represented as a set containing the conditions that are true in the state. If the preconditions of an action
Pre ⇒ Post are satisfied in a state S, then executing this action in state S leads to the state S ∪ Post .
Definition 13 (PLANSAT [8]). PLANSAT is the decision problem: given a propositional STRIPS planning problem φ =
(P ,O, I,G), determine whether there exists a sequence of operators that leads from I to a state that satisfies the goal G.
PLANSAT1 is PLANSAT under the restriction that the precondition of every action contains at most one condition. PLANSAT+
is PLANSAT under the restriction that all postconditions in φ are positive.
Theorem 5. For the problem class [|pre| ≤ 1, |goal| ≤ k], RE can be solved in polynomial time and EPP is true.
Proof. The proof is based on a reduction fromminiARBAC reachability analysis to STRIPS planning [8]. The reduction allows
us to use a planning algorithm to solve the reachability analysis problem.
Let I = (γ , goal, ψ) be in the problem class [|pre| ≤ 1, |goal| ≤ k] where γ = (R,UA) and ψ = (can_assign,
can_revoke, SMER). Without loss of generality, we can assume SMER = ∅, because SMER constraints can be transformed
into negative preconditions, as described in Section 3. Then, |goal| ≤ k, and for each (c, r) ∈ can_assign ∪ can_revoke,
|c| ≤ 1. Construct an instance φ = (P ,O, I,G) of the PLANSAT1 problem as follows.
• P = R.
• G = goal. Thus |G| ≤ k.
• I = UA.
• O = O+ ∪ O−.
• O+ = {UserAssign(r) : (c, r) ∈ can_assign.
– pre(UserAssign(r)) = c .
– post(UserAssign(r)) = r .
• O− = {UserRevoke(r) : (c, r) ∈ can_revoke.
– pre(UserRevoke(r)) = c .
– post(UserRevoke(r)) = ¬r .
For every operator o ∈ O, pre(o) ≤ 1 since for each (c, r) ∈ can_assign ∪ can_revoke, |c| ≤ 1. Thus φ is in PLANSAT1 and
the number of goals in φ is limited to a constant k. In addition, |φ| = O(|I|). It is easy to see that a plan for I is also a plan for
φ and vice versa.
From Theorem 3.8 in [8] the PLANSAT1 problem limited to constant number of goals is solvable in polynomial time. Thus,
RE for the problem class [|pre| ≤ 1, |goal| ≤ k] can be solved in polynomial time and EPP is true. 
Theorem 6. Reachability (RE) for the problem class [CR,D, |pre| ≤ 1, EI] (only unconditional role revocation, no disjunction, at
most one precondition, empty initial state) is solvable in polynomial time.
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Proof. Let I = (γ , goal, ψ) be a problem instance in the problem class [CR,D, |pre| ≤ 1, EI], where γ = (R,UA),
ψ = (can_assign, can_revoke, SMER), and goal is a set of roles. Then, for every role r ∈ R, (1) there is at most one state
change rule (c, r) ∈ can_assign, (2) |c| ≤ 1, and (3) (true, r) ∈ can_revoke. Also, since negative preconditions are allowed,
we can assume without loss of generality that SMER = ∅. Note that the definition of the size restriction |pre| ≤ 1 counts
SMER constraints, so transforming SMER constraints into negative preconditions preserves that restriction.
Construct a graph Gψ = (Vψ , Eψ ) as follows. The set of vertices Vψ is the set of roles R. There are two kinds of edges in
Eψ , positive and negative. For each (r ′, r) ∈ can_assign, e = (r ′, r) ∈ Eψ , and label(e) = pos. For each (¬r ′, r) ∈ can_assign,
e = (r, r ′) ∈ Eψ and label(e) = neg. Note that neg edges have reverse direction as the pos edges. Intuitively, edges in
Eψ indicate the order in which roles must be assigned and revoked; if (r, r ′) ∈ Eψ , then UserAssign(r) must occur before
UserAssign(r ′). Next, we prune the graph Gψ by removing vertices for which there is no assignment rule and vertices that
are reachable through a sequence of positive incoming edges from such vertices. These vertices are not reachable from the
empty initial state because each vertex in Gψ has at most one positive incoming edge (this follows from |pre| ≤ 1 and D). A
cycle is called a pos cycle if it is composed of only pos edges; neg cycles are defined similarly.
Lemma 7. Let Y be a cycle in Gψ . Then Y is either a pos cycle or a neg cycle.
Proof. Suppose Y contains a pos edge and a neg edge. Then there exist vertices r, r1 and r2 in Y such that (r, r1) is a pos
edge and (r1, r2) is a neg edge. This means that there are two assignment rules for r1, (r, r1) ∈ can_assign and (¬r2, r1) ∈
can_assign, which violates the D restriction.  Lemma 7
Lemma 8. RE for I = (γ , goal, ψ) where γ = (R,∅) is false if and only if either (C1) Gψ contains a pos cycle Y such that
Y ∩ goal ≠ ∅, (C2) Gψ contains a neg cycle Y such that Y ⊆ goal, or (C3) goal ⊈ Gψ .
Proof. First, we show that if one of the conditions C1, C2, and C3 holds, then RE for I is false.
Case 1: Suppose C1 is true, i.e., Gψ contains a pos cycle Y and r ∈ Y ∩ goal. Then, since we start in the empty state γ and
sinceψ satisfies the D restriction, the only way to derive the goal r is to first derive all roles in the cycle Y , including r itself.
Thus, deriving role r entails deriving itself first, and hence no plan for deriving r exists. Therefore RE for I is false.
Case 2: Suppose C2 is true, i.e., Gψ contains a neg cycle Y and Y ⊆ goal. Let Y = (r1 → r2 → · · · → rk → r1).
Then, (¬r1, rk) ∈ can_assign, and for 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, (¬ri+1, ri) ∈ can_assign. Let P be a plan for I; i.e., γ P→ γ ′ and
∀1 ≤ i ≤ k : ri ∈ γ ′. Since we start in the empty state γ , ∀1 ≤ i ≤ k : UserAssign(ri) ∈ P . Without loss of generality
assume that UserAssign(rk) is the last action in P . Since the precondition for UserAssign(rk) is ¬r1, it follows that r1 /∈ γ ′
which contradicts the assumption that P is a plan for I . Thus, RE for I is false.
Case 3: If C3 is true, then there is no assignment rule for at least one of the goals and hence goal is not reachable.
Next, we show that if RE for I is false, then C1 or C2 or C3 is true. We prove the contrapositive, i.e., we assume
conditions C1, C2 and C3 are false, and we show that RE for I is true, by giving an algorithm that constructs a plan for I . If
all of C1, C2 and C3 are false, then Gψ contains all goals and one of the following cases holds: (1) Gψ is acyclic, in which
case the topological-sort ordering of Gψ gives the order in which roles must be assigned to reach goal; (2) Gψ contains a neg
cycle Y such that there exists s ∈ Y and s /∈ goal; or (3) Gψ contains a pos cycle Y such that Y ∩ goal = ∅. We break cycles
in (2) by deleting each neg edge e = (r, s) such that r ∈ goal and s /∈ goal. Since e is a neg edge, we know that (¬s, r) ∈
can_assign. Thus, in a plan for I ,UserRevoke(s) occurs betweenUserAssign(s) andUserAssign(r). We need to ensure that every
UserAssign(s′) that has a precondition s occurs beforeUserRevoke(s) and hence beforeUserAssign(r) in the plan.We add edge
(s′, r) to Gψ to ensure this. Regarding case (3), we can simply delete all cycles that do not contain any goal. With the above
transformations, the resulting graph G′ψ is acyclic, and we can generate a plan for I by assigning roles (to the user) in the
topological-sort order of G′ψ . The algorithm is given in Algorithm 1.  Lemma 8
Constructing graph Gψ takes polynomial time, and |Gψ | = |I|. Validity of C1 can be checked by restricting Gψ to only pos
edges. Sinceψ satisfies theD (no disjunction) restriction, in this restricted graph each vertex has atmost one incoming edge.
This implies that all cycles in the graph are disjoint and we can use a simple Depth-First Search to find all cycles and check
whether any cycle contains a role not in goal. Validity of condition C2 can be checked by restricting Gψ to vertices in goal and
to neg edges, and checking whether the restricted graph contains a cycle; a simple Depth-First Search can accomplish this.
Validity of condition C3 can be checked by traversing Gψ at most once. Hence C1, C2 and C3 can be checked in polynomial
time. Transforming Gψ to an acyclic graph G′ψ takes polynomial time, and |G′ψ | is O(|Gψ |2), since for each neg edge in Gψ ,
at most |Gψ | new edges may be added. Topologically sorting G′ψ takes polynomial time. Thus, Reachability for this problem
class can be solved in polynomial time.  Theorem 6
The problem class to which Theorem 6 applies can be expanded by reducing problem instances that do not satisfy the EI
(empty initial state) restriction to problem instances that satisfy EI . The next two lemmas express such reductions.
Lemma 9. Suppose ψ satisfies CR. RE for ((R,UA), goal, ψ) is true if RE for ((R,∅), goal, ψ) is true.
Proof. Since ψ allows unconditional revocation of all roles, we can revoke all roles r ∈ UA to transform the initial RBAC
state to the empty state (R,∅). We then check if (R, goal) is reachable from (R,∅). Thus, if a state (R,UA1) is reachable from
the empty state, then it is reachable from any state. 
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Algorithm 1 Plan generation for the problem class [CR,D, |pre| ≤ 1, EI]
Input: Problem instance I = ((R,∅), goal, ψ)
Output: Returns the plan if a plan exists for I , else returns false
1: if C1, C2 or C3 is true for Gψ then
2: return false
3: end if
4: Construct graph G′ψ = (V ′ψ , E ′ψ )
5: Construct graph G′′ψ = comp(G′ψ , goal)
6: Topologically sort G′′ψ .
7: Plan P = ⟨⟩
8: UAnew = ∅
9: for all r ∈ V ′′ψ in topologically sorted order do
10: (c, r) ∈ can_assign
11: if c = ¬s ∧ s ∈ UAnew then
12: P = P.⟨UserRevoke(s)⟩
13: UAnew = UAnew \ {s}
14: end if
15: P = P.⟨UserAssign(r)⟩
16: UAnew = UAnew ∪ {r}
17: return P
18: end for
Lemma 10. RE for ((R,UA), goal, ψ) is false if RE for ((R,∅),UA, ψ) is true and RE for ((R,∅), goal, ψ) is false.
Proof. Let I , I1, and I2 denote the three problem instances in the statement of the lemma, in the order they appear. The proof
is by contradiction. Suppose for contradiction that RE for I is true, i.e., there is a path P from (R,UA) to (R, goal). Since I1 is
true, there is a path P1 from (R,∅) to (R,UA). The concatenation of P1 and P is a plan for I2, contradicting the hypothesis
that RE for I2 is false. 
Theorem 11. For the problem class [D, R], RE is solvable in polynomial time and EPP is true.
Proof. Let I = (γ , goal, ψ) be a problem instance that satisfies the [D, R] restriction where γ = (R,UA), ψ =
(can_assign,∅, SMER). Without loss of generality, we assume SMER = ∅.
For (c, r) ∈ can_assign, let post((c, r)) = r , ppre((c, r)) = positive literals in c , and npre((c, r)) = negative literals in c.
We will sometimes refer to elements of can_assign as ‘‘rules’’.
For a role r , let rule(r) be the unique element of can_assign with postcondition r , if any, otherwise ⊥. For convenience,
define ppre(⊥) = ⊥.
Let goals be the limit of the following monotonically increasing sequence of subsets of R: goals0 = goal and goalsi+1 =
(goalsi ∪ (∪r∈goalsippre(rule(r)))) \ UA. The D assumption implies that in every plan for I , all of the roles in goals must be
added to the state. If ⊥ ∈ goals, then return false (i.e., there is no plan for I), because there is no rule to add some role in
goals.
Let S = ∪r∈goalsrule(r). The D assumption implies that in every plan for I , every rule in S must be fired at least once.
The R assumption implies that it suffices to fire each rule at most once. Thus, there exists a plan for I if and only if some
linearization of S is a plan for I .
If UA∩ (∪r∈goalsnpre(r)) ≠ ∅, then return false. This is because some rule in S has a negative precondition that cannot be
satisfied, regardless of the order in which rules are fired.
Now consider constraints on the order of firing the rules in S. A rule ρ in S must fire before another rule ρ ′ in S, denoted
ρ < ρ ′, if post(ρ) ∈ ppre(ρ ′) or post(ρ ′) ∈ npre(ρ). At this point in the algorithm (i.e., if the algorithm has not already
returned false), every plan satisfying these ordering constraints is feasible. This means that there exists a plan for I iff the
graph G = (S, <) is acyclic.
Constructing G and testing acyclicity takes polynomial time in |I|, so reachability for this problem class is decidable in
polynomial time. If G is acyclic, then any topological sort of G is a plan for I , and its length is polynomial in |I|. Thus EPP for
this problem class is true. 
Theorem 12. RE for the problem class [CR, EN, |ppre| ≤ 1, |goal| ≤ k] (where k is a constant) is solvable in polynomial time. In
addition, EPP for the class is true.
Proof. Let I = (γ , goal, ψ) be a problem instance in the problem class [CR, EN, |ppre| ≤ 1, |goal| ≤ k], where γ = (R,UA),
ψ = (can_assign, can_revoke, SMER). Then, for each r ∈ R, (true, r) ∈ can_revoke (i.e., every role can be unconditionally
revoked), and if (c, r) ∈ can_assign, then |c| ≤ 1 and c is true or a positive literal.
Algorithm 2 checks plan existence for this problem class. The algorithm starts with the state goal. At each step it picks
an unexplored node and explores it. During the process of exploration, new states are generated that are then recursively
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Algorithm 2 Reachability for the problem class [CR, EN, |ppre| ≤ 1, |goal| ≤ k]
Input: Problem instance I = ((R,UA0), goal, ψ)
Output: Returns a directed graph and an initial state if a plan exists for I , else returns false.
1: if ∃ r1, r2 ∈ goal : (r1, r2) ∈ SMER then
2: return false
3: end if
4: Vertex set Vψ = {goal}
5: Edge set Eψ = ∅
6: while There exists an unexplored node in Vψ do
7: Pick an unexplored node UA from Vψ .
8: Mark UA as explored
9: if UA ⊆ UA0 then
10: return (Vψ , Eψ ) and UA
11: else
12: for all r ∈ UA do
13: for all (s, r) ∈ can_assign do
14: if s == true then
15: UAnew = UA \ {r}
16: else
17: UAnew = (UA ∪ {s}) \ {r}
18: end if
19: S = {r ′ ∈ R : (r, r ′) ∈ SMER}
20: if UAnew ∩ S ≠ ∅ then
21: continue
22: end if
23: if UAnew /∈ Vψ then
24: Add UAnew to Vψ and mark it unexplored
25: end if
26: Add edge e = (UAnew,UA) to Eψ and set label(e) = UserAssign(r)
27: end for
28: end for
29: end if
30: end while
31: return false
explored. Furthermore, a directed graph Gψ = (Vψ , Eψ ) is constructed during the process of exploration such that Vψ
contains all generated states and Eψ contains explored transitions between those states. Let UA0 be the initial state. When
exploring a state UA, if there exists some role r ∉ UA0 in the state such that the precondition of every can_assign rule
for r contains a role that is mutually exclusive with r , then r is not reachable from UA0. If a state UA ⊆ UA0 is reached, the
algorithm returns the graphGψ andUA. The CR restriction implies that the stateUA is reachable fromUA0 simply by revoking
all roles in UA0 \ UA.
If plan existence for I is true, then a plan can be generated from Gψ and UA as follows. Let P = ⟨e1, e2, . . . , en⟩
be a path in Gψ from UA to the final state UAfinal = goal. Let π = A1.A2. . . . .An where label(ei) = UserAssign(ri),
Si = {r ′ ∈ R : (ri, r ′) ∈ SMER}, and Ai = {UserRevoke(s) : s ∈ Si}.UserAssign(ri). Note that Ai consists of the indicated
UserRevoke actions in arbitrary order, followed by the indicated UserAssign action. It is easy to see that π is a plan for I .
Each state in Gψ contains at most k roles, because the search starts with the state goal, and the assignments on lines 15
and 17 ensure that |UAnew| ≤ |UA| . To bound the number of states, note that there are
|R|
k

different sets containing exactly
k roles, and there are 2k subsets of each of them, so the total number of states in Gψ is O(2k ×
|R|
k

), which is O(|I|k) (recall
that k is considered constant). Since the number of explored states is polynomial in |I|, it is easy to see that Algorithm 2 runs
in time polynomial in |I|. Thus, RE for the problem class [CR, EN, |ppre| ≤ 1, |goal| ≤ k] can be solved in polynomial time.
A plan for I is atmost the length of the longest path in Gψ times themaximum length of an Ai. The former length isO(|I|k),
and the latter length is O(k), so EPP for the problem class [CR, EN, |ppre| ≤ 1, |goal| ≤ k] is true. 
5.3. Proofs for NP-completeness of reachability analysis
Theorem 13. For the problem class [R], RE is in NP and EPP is true.
Proof. Let I = (γ , goal, ψ) be a reachability analysis problem in the problem class [R] where γ = (R,UA) and ψ =
(can_assign, can_revoke, SMER). Since ψ satisfies the R restriction, can_revoke= ∅. From Lemma 3, it follows that if I has a
plan, then I has a plan of length at most |R|, and the plan consists entirely of UserAssign actions. Thus EPP for the problem
class [R] is true.
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Given a sequence P of UserAssign(ri) actions (ri ∈ R) with |P| ≤ |R|, a Turing Machine can verify whether P is a plan for I
by (1) executing P on γ and transforming it to a state γ ′ = (R,UA′), and (2) checking that goal ⊆ UA′. Both these operations
take time polynomial in |I|. Thus, RE for the problem class R is in NP. 
Theorem 14. RE for the problem classes [R, EN, |pre| ≤ 1, |SMER(r)| ≤ 1] and [R, EN, |goal| = 1, |SMER(r)| ≤ 1] are NP-
hard.
Proof. First, we show that RE for the problem class [R, EN, |pre| ≤ 1, |SMER(r)| ≤ 1] is NP-hard. The proof follows the proof
of NP-hardness of the PLANSAT+ problem [8, (Theorem 3.5)]. We reduce 3-SAT to RE for the above problem class. Consider
a 3-SAT formula φ = C1 ∧ C2 ∧ · · · ∧ Cn containing propositional variables in V = {x1, . . . , xm}, where Ci = li1 ∨ li2 ∨ li3,
and each literal lij is a variable in V or the negation of one. Construct a problem instance I = (γ , goal, ψ) as follows.
1. The set of roles R is defined as follows. For each literal xi ∈ V there are two roles ti and fi in R. For each clause Ci, there is
a role ci in R.
2. γ = (R,∅). goal = {c1, c2, . . . , cn}.
3. ψ = (can_assign, can_revoke, SMER) is defined as follows.
(a) For 1 ≤ i ≤ m : (true, ti) ∈ can_assign.
(b) For 1 ≤ i ≤ m : (true, fi) ∈ can_assign.
(c) For each clause Ci = li1 ∨ li2 ∨ li3, for 1 ≤ j ≤ 3, if lij is the literal xk then (tk, ci) ∈ can_assign, else if lij is the literal¬xk
then (fk, ci) ∈ can_assign.
(d) can_revoke= ∅.
(e) SMER = {(ti, fi) : xi ∈ V }.
Because can_revoke= ∅, I satisfies the R restriction. Also, the can_assign rules do not contain¬, and ti appears only with
fi in SMER (and vice versa). Thus the policy satisfies the EN and |SMER(r)| ≤ 1 restrictions. Furthermore, can_assign also
satisfies the |pre| ≤ 1 restriction.
Lemma 15. If RE for I is true then φ = C1 ∧ C2 ∧ · · · ∧ Cn is satisfiable.
Proof. From Theorem 13 we know that I has a plan P = (a1, a2, . . . , am) where each ai is a UserAssign action and m ≤ |R|.
Construct an assignment π to literals in V as follows.
1. If UserAssign(ti) ∈ P then π(xi) = true.
2. If UserAssign(fi) ∈ P then π(xi) = false.
Note that only one of UserAssign(ti) or UserAssign(fi) can occur in P; (ti, fi) ∈ SMER and since can_revoke= ∅, once either
of UserAssign(ti) or UserAssign(fi) occurs in P , the other action cannot occur in P . Thus π is a well-formed assignment.
Let γ
a1→ γ1 a2→ γ2 · · · au→ γu, where ∀1 ≤ i ≤ u : γi = (R,UAi). Since P is a plan, ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n : ci ∈ UAu. Thus, for each ci,
∃ j ≤ u : aj = UserAssign(ci). Since UserAssign(ci) is enabled in γj−1, there exists a state change rule (X, ci) ∈ can_assign such
that X ∈ UAj−1. Thus, ∃ v < j− 1 : av = UserAssign(X). From the construction of I it follows that if X = tk then xk ∈ Ci and
π(xk) = true, and if X = fk then ¬xk ∈ Ci and π(xk) = false. Thus, π(Ci) = true. Since this is true for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
π(φ) = true. Thus, φ is satisfiable.  Lemma 15
Lemma 16. If φ is satisfiable then RE for I is true.
Proof. Consider a satisfiable assignment π of φ. Construct a sequence of actions P = P ′.P ′′ as follows. For all literals xi ∈ V ,
if π(xi) = true then UserAssign(ti) ∈ P ′, and if π(xi) = false then UserAssign(fi) ∈ P ′. P ′′ = {UserAssign(ci) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
We show that P is a plan for I .
Note that every action a ∈ P ′ is enabled in γ . Let γ P ′→ γ ′. For every clause Ci = li1 ∨ li2 ∨ li3, since π(Ci) = true,
∃ 1 ≤ j ≤ 3 : π(lij) = true. If lij = xk then π(xk) = true and hence UserAssign(tk) ∈ P ′. Also, (tk, ci) ∈ can_assign.
Similarly, if lij = ¬xk then π(xk) = false, UserAssign(fk) ∈ P ′, and (fk, ci) ∈ can_assign. Thus all actions UserAssign(ci) ∈ P ′′
are enabled in γ ′. Therefore γ ′ P
′′→ γ ′′ where γ ′′ = (R,UA′′) and ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n : ci ∈ UA′′. Thus P = P ′.P ′′ is a plan for I . 
Lemma 16
From Lemmas 15 and 16 it follows that RE for the problem class [R, EN, |pre| ≤ 1, |SMER(r)| ≤ 1] is NP-hard.
As discussed in Section 4, reachability of a goal containingmultiple roles can be transformed to reachability of a singleton
goal, and the transformation preserves all restrictions except |pre| ≤ k and |ppre| ≤ k. Therefore, the above proof can directly
be applied to show that reachability for the problem class [R, EN, |goal| = 1, |SMER(r)| ≤ 1] is NP-hard.  Theorem 14
Theorem 17. For the problem classes [R], [R, EN], [R, EN, |goal| = 1, |SMER(r)| ≤ 1], and [R, EN, |pre| ≤ 1, |SMER(r)| ≤ 1],
RE is NP-complete and EPP is true.
Proof. Follows immediately from Theorems 13 and 14. 
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5.4. Proofs for NP-hardness of reachability analysis
Theorem 18. Reachability (RE) and Bounded Reachability (BRE) for the problem class [|pre| ≤ 1] are NP-hard.
Proof. NP-hardness of RE for this problem class is a corollary of Theorem 17, which shows that RE is NP-complete for amore
restricted problem class. NP-hardness of BRE for this problem class follows from NP-hardness of RE and Lemma 1. 
Theorem 19. EPP for the complexity class [D, CR, EN, |goal| = 1, |SMER(r)| ≤ 1] is false.
Proof. Consider the problem instance In = (γ , goal, ψ)where:
• the set of roles R = {u1, u2, . . . , un, v1, v2, . . . , vn},
• γ = (R,∅)
• goal = {un}
• ψ = (can_assign, can_revoke, SMER)where
– SMER = {(ui, vi) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}
– ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n : (true, vi) ∈ can_revoke
– ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n : (true, vi) ∈ can_assign
– ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n : (true, ui) ∈ can_revoke
– (true, u1) ∈ can_assign, (u1, u2) ∈ can_assign and ∀ 3 ≤ i ≤ n if i = 2k + 1 then (v1 ∧ v2 · · · ∧ vi−2 ∧ ui−1, ui) ∈
can_assign, else if i = 2k then (u1 ∧ u2 ∧ · · · ∧ ui−1, ui) ∈ can_assign.
The can_revoke relation specifies that for every role r ∈ R, UserRevoke(r) has a true precondition. Thus, In satisfies the
CR restriction (every role can be unconditionally revoked). For every role r ∈ R, there is a unique state change rule (c, r)
in both can_assign and can_revoke. Thus In satisfies the D restriction. The preconditions in can_assign and can_revoke do not
contain negation, and each role ui appears only with vi in SMER. Thus In satisfies the EN and |SMER(r)| ≤ 1 restrictions.
Define the following sequences.1
• ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n : Vi = ⟨UserAssign(v1), UserAssign(v2), . . . , UserAssign(vi)⟩. Given any state γ , γ Vi→ γ ∪ {v1...i}
• V ′i = ⟨UserRevoke(v1),UserRevoke(v2), . . . , UserRevoke(vi)⟩. Given any state γ , γ
V ′i→ γ \ {v1...i}
• U ′i = ⟨UserRevoke(u1),UserRevoke(u2), . . . , UserRevoke(ui)⟩. Given any state γ , γ
U ′i→ γ \ {u1...i}
• U2i = U2i−1.⟨UserAssign(u2i)⟩, and U2i+1 = U2i.U ′2i−1.V2i−1.⟨UserAssign(u2i+1)⟩.V ′2i−1.U2i−1• α2i = U2i and α2i+1 = U2i.U ′2i−1.V2i−1.⟨UserAssign(u2i+1)⟩
Lemma 20. αn is the minimum size plan for In.
Proof. First we show that αn is a plan for In. Define γi = (R, {u1, u2, . . . , ui}). Then γ = γ0. It is easy to see that γ0 Ui→ γi:
γ0
U1→ γ1 is true, and applying induction, if γ0 Ui−1→ γi−1, then
1. if i = 2k then γ2k−1 UserAssign(u2k)→ γ2k. Thus γ0 U2k→ γ2k
2. if i = 2k+ 1 then γ2k
U ′2k−1.V2k−1.⟨UserAssign(u2k+1)⟩.V ′2k−1→ γ ′ where γ ′ = (R, {u2k, u2k+1}). Because γ0 U2k−1→ γ2k−1, and u2k and
u2k+1 does not affect this derivation, γ ′
U2k−1→ γ2k+1. Thus γ0 U2k+1→ γ2k+1.
Also note that un ∈ γn. Therefore, Un is a plan for In. Since αn is a prefix of Un and the last action in αn is UserAssign(un), αn
is a plan for In.
Next we argue that αn is theminimum plan for reaching the goal un. The proof is by induction. α1 = ⟨UserAssign(u1)⟩ and
α2 = ⟨UserAssign(u1),UserAssign(u2)⟩ are trivially the minimal plans for reaching the goals u1 and u2 respectively. Suppose
for k < n, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, αi is the minimum plan for reaching goal ui. We show that αk+1 is the minimum plan for achieving the
goal uk+1.
Observation: If i = 2j (i.e., i is even), then since the precondition of UserAssign(u2j) is u1, u2, . . . , u2j−1, it follows that
any path to goal u2j must go through the state
ν2j = (R, {u1, u2, . . . , u2j−1, u2j}). Similarly, if i = 2j + 1 (i.e., i is odd), then since the precondition of
UserAssign(u2j+1) is v1, v2, . . . , v2j−1, u2j, it follows that any path to goal u2j+1 must go through the state ν2j+1 =
(R, {v1, v2, . . . , v2j−1, u2j, u2j+1}). Thus, if ν0 = (R,∅), then since αi is the shortest path to ui, it follows that ν0 αi→ νi,
i.e., αi transforms the initial state ν0 to νi.
Case 1: k = 2j for some j, i.e., k is even. Any path to the goal u2j+1 must go through the state ν2j+1. Thus, the shortest
path to u2j+1 ends in state ν2j+1. Let P be the shortest path to u2j+1, and P ends in ν2j+1. Since u2j ∈ ν2j+1, it follows from the
1 We use angle brackets to denote sequences. x.y denotes the concatenation of sequences x and y.
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above observation that P goes through the state ν2j. Thus, P = ⟨P1, P2⟩where P1 is the shortest path from ν0 to ν2j, and P2 is
the shortest path from ν2j to ν2j+1. By the induction hypothesis, P1 is α2j. It is clear that P2 = U ′2j−1.V2j−1.⟨UserAssign(u2j+1)⟩.
Thus, P = α2j.U ′2j−1.V2j−1.⟨UserAssign(u2j+1)⟩ = α2j+1 = αk+1. Therefore, αk+1 is the minimum plan for achieving the goal
uk+1.
Case 2: k = 2j−1 for some j, i.e., k is odd. Any path to goal u2j must go through the state ν2j. Thus, the shortest path to u2j
ends in state ν2j. Let P be the shortest path to u2j, and P ends in ν2j. Since u2j−1 ∈ ν2j, it follows from the above observation
that P goes through the state ν2j−1. Thus, P = P1.P2 where P1 is the shortest path from ν0 to ν2j−1, and P2 is the shortest path
from ν2j−1 to ν2j. By the induction hypothesis, P1 = α2j−1. It is clear that P2 should first revoke all the v1, v2, . . . , v2j−3 roles
before assigning the u1, u2, . . . , u2j−3 roles. After all the v1, v2, . . . , v2j−3 roles are revoked, P2 must transform the state ν0
to the state ν2j−2. Since u2j−1 and u2j−2 are in ν2j−1, and reachability of u1, . . . , u2j−3 using U2j−3 is not affected by carrying
along u2j−1 and u2j−2 in the state, we conclude that P = α2j−1.V ′2j−3.U2j−3.⟨UserAssign(u2j)⟩ = U2j−1.⟨UserAssign(u2j)⟩ = α2j.
Therefore αk+1 is the minimum plan for achieving the goal uk+1.
From Cases 1 and 2 it follows that αn is the minimum plan for achieving the goal un.  Lemma 20
Lemma 21. |αn| = Ω(2p(n)) where p(n) is a polynomial in n.
Proof. We first show that |Un| = Ω(2n). Note that |U2i+1| = |U2i|+|U2i−1|+ci where ci is a constant. Also, |U2i| = |U2i−1|+1.
It follows that |U2i+1| = 2|U2i−1| + ci + 1. This implies |U2i+1| ≥ 2i|U1| = Ω(2i). Thus, |Un| = Ω(2n/2). From the definition
of αn, we have |αn| = Ω(2n/2).  Lemma 21
Note that |In| is O(n2). Thus, from Lemmas 20 and 21, it follows that the minimum size plan for In is not polynomial in |In|.
Therefore, EPP for the problem class [D, CR, EN, |SMER(r)| ≤ 1] is false.  Theorem 19
Theorem 22. EPP for the complexity class [D, EN, |ppre| ≤ 1, |goal| = 1] is false.
Proof. Consider the problem instance In = (γ , goal, ψ)where:
• the set of roles R = {r1, r2, . . . , rn}.• γ = (R,∅)
• goal = {rn}• ψ = (can_assign, can_revoke, SMER)where
– ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n− 2, i+ 2 ≤ j ≤ n : (ri, rj) ∈ SMER
– (true, r1) ∈ can_assign and ∀ 2 ≤ i ≤ n : (ri−1, ri) ∈ can_assign
– (true, r1) ∈ can_revoke and ∀ 2 ≤ i ≤ n : (ri−1, ri) ∈ can_revoke
For each role ri, the can_assign and can_revoke relations have precondition ri−1. Define the following sequences.
• ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n : Si = R′i.R′i−1 . . . R′1• R′1 = ⟨UserRevoke(r1)⟩ and ∀ 2 ≤ i ≤ n : R′i = Ri−1.⟨UserRevoke(ri)⟩• R1 = ⟨UserAssign(r1)⟩, R2 = ⟨UserAssign(r1), UserAssign(r2)⟩, and ∀ 3 ≤ i ≤ n : Ri = Ri−1.Si−2.⟨UserAssign(ri)⟩
It is easy to see that Rn is a plan for In. We can show that Rn is the minimum plan for In similar to the proof of Theorem 19.
In addition, |Rk| = |Rk−1| + |Sk−2| + 1 = |Rk−1| + 1+Σk−2i=1 |R′i| = k− 1+ |Rk−1| +Σk−3i=1 |Ri|. Since |Rk| is monotonic in k, it
follows that |Rk| > 2|Rk−3|, and hence |Rn| = Ω(2n/3). Therefore, the minimum plan for In has size exponential in |In|. Thus,
EPP for the problem class [D, EN, |ppre| ≤ 1, |goal| ≤ 1] is false. 
Theorem 23. EPP for the problem class with no restrictions is false.
Proof. Follows immediately from Theorem 19 or Theorem 22. 
Lemma 24. Bounded Reachability (BRE) for the problem class [D, CR, EN, |ppre| ≤ 2, |SMER(r)| ≤ 1] is NP-hard.
Proof. The proof is by reduction from the CLIQUE problem, which is known to be NP-complete [22]. The proof is based on
the proof of Theorem 4.15 in [7], but our construction and proof are more complicated, because we are dealing with a more
restricted problem class. Given a graph G = (V , E) where V = {v1, . . . , vn} and an integer k, the CLIQUE problem asks
whether G has a clique of size k, i.e., whether there is a set C ⊆ V of size k such that there is an edge between every pair of
vertices in C . We construct a problem instance I = (γ , goal, ψ) in the problem class [D, CR, EN, |pre| ≤ 2, |SMER(r)| ≤ 1]
such that G has a clique of size k if and only if I has a plan of size at most n2 + 13n− k. The basic idea behind the reduction
is to construct an ARBAC policy such that the following hold. (1) If the policy has a plan, then the plan can be regarded as an
interleaving of several sequences of actions, with one such sequence of actions corresponding to each node of G. If a node vi
is in a clique of size k or larger, then there are two feasible options –with different sizes – for the subsequence corresponding
to vi. If vi is not in a clique of size k (or larger), then only one of the options – the longer one – is possible. (2) If the policy
has a plan, the size of the shortest plan is p(n)−mk, where p(n) is some polynomial in n, andm is an integer constant. The
construction is designed to make the plan length anti-monotonic in (i.e., a non-increasing function of) k, because, if a graph
contains a clique of size greater than k, then it also contains a clique of size k, so considering a larger clique must not make
the length of the plan exceed the bound in the generated BRE problem instance.
Let Ni = {v ∈ V : (v, vi) /∈ E}. Note that |Ni| = 0 if there are edges between vi and all other vertices in V . Define
I = (γ , goal, ψ)where
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1. γ = (R,UA), where R =1≤i≤n{vi, ai, bi, ci, c¯i, di, d¯i, ei} ∪ 1≤i,j≤n{gij, hij} and UA = {ci, di : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
2. ψ = (can_assign, can_revoke, SMER)where
• can_assign is defined as
(a) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n : (true, vi) ∈ can_assign
(b) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n : (c¯i ∧ di, ai) ∈ can_assign
(c) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n : (ci ∧ d¯i, bi) ∈ can_assign
(d) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n : (true, c¯i) ∈ can_assign
(e) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n : (true, d¯i) ∈ can_assign
(f1) ∀0 ≤ i ≤ n : (true, hi,0) ∈ can_assign
(f2) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, 0 ≤ j < |Ni| : (hi,j ∧ Ni,j+1, hi,j+1) ∈ can_assign, where Ni,j is the jth element of Ni, taken in arbitrary
order
(f3) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, |Ni| ≤ j < n : (hi,j, hi,j+1) ∈ can_assign
(g1) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n : (true, gi,1) ∈ can_assign
(g2) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n,∀1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1 : (gi,j, gi,j+1) ∈ can_assign
(h) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n : (vi ∧ gi,n, ci) ∈ can_assign
(i) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n : (hi,n, di) ∈ can_assign
(j) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n : (true, ei) ∈ can_assign
• can_revoke is defined as
(a) ∀r ∈ R : (true, r) ∈ can_revoke
• SMER is defined as
(a) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n : (ci, c¯i) ∈ SMER
(b) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n : (di, d¯i) ∈ SMER
(c) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n : (vi, ei) ∈ SMER
3. goal = {ai, bi, c¯i, d¯i, ei : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
bi serves as a flag that (when present in the state) indicates that the plan passed through a state containing ci and di.
ai serves as a flag indicating that the plan passed though a state containing c i and di. hi,n serves as a flag indicating that a
plan passed through a state containing all nodes vj that are not neighbors of vi. This means that if all vj not in any clique of
size k are reachable, then hi,n are reachable for all vi in the clique. For example, suppose that V = {v1, v2, v3, v4, v5} and
the maximum clique is C = {v1, v2, v3}; then for every s ∈ [4..5], there exists t ∈ [1..3] such that (vs, vt) ∉ E. From the
definitions of hi,j and Ni, it follows that roles h1,n, h2,n, and h3,n can be added after roles v4 and v5 have been added. Roles gi,j
are introduced for the purpose of constructing a plan with size anti-monotonic to k.
Note that, starting from the initial state, ci must be revoked in order to add ai, and di must be revoked in order to add bi.
This means that in order to reach the goal, (1) after ai is added, ci must be added in order to add bi, and (2) after bi is added, di
must be added in order to add ai. Since vi and gi,n are the preconditions of ci, and hi,n is the precondition of di, if there exists
a plan, then gi,n and vi must appear between UR(ci) and UA(ci) in the plan, and hi,n must appear between UR(di) and UA(di)
in the plan, where UA and UR abbreviate UserAssign and UserRevoke, respectively.
Each role has a precondition of size at most 2, so I satisfies the |pre| ≤ 2 restriction. Each role has at most one
state change rule in can_assign and can_revoke, so I satisfies the D restriction. Each role is allowed to be unconditionally
revoked, so I satisfies the CR restriction. Negation is specified only as SMER constraints, so I satisfies the EN restriction. Each
role appears in at most one SMER constraint, so I satisfies the |SMER(r)| ≤ 1 restriction. Thus, I is in the problem class
[D, CR, EN, |pre| ≤ 2, |SMER(r)| ≤ 1].
Lemma 25. Suppose G = (V , E) has a clique of size k. Then I has a plan of size n2 + 13n− k or less.
Proof. Let C be a clique in G of size k. Consider the sequence of actions P = P1.P2.P3.P4.P5.P6.P7.P8 where UA(⟨r1, . . . , rn⟩)
abbreviates UA(r1) . . .UA(rn).
1. P1 is the concatenation of the sequences ⟨UR(ci),UA(c¯i),UA(ai)⟩ for vi ∈ V − C . Note: |P1| = 3n− 3k.
2. P2 is the concatenation of the sequences ⟨UR(di),UA(d¯i),UA(bi)⟩ for vi ∈ C . Note: |P2| = 3k.
3. P3 is the concatenation of the sequences ⟨UA(vi)⟩ for vi ∈ V − C . Note: |P3| = n− k.
4. P4 is the concatenation of the sequences ⟨UA(Hi)⟩ for vi ∈ C , where Hi = ⟨hi,0, hi,1, . . . , hi,n⟩. Note : |Hi| = n + 1, so,
|P4| = (n+ 1)× k.
5. P5 is the concatenation of the sequences ⟨UR(d¯i),UA(di),UR(ci),UA(c¯i),UA(ai), UR(di),UA(d¯i)⟩ for vi ∈ C . Note: |P5| =
7k.
6. P6 is the concatenation of the sequences ⟨UA(Gi)⟩ for Vi ∈ V − C , where Gi = ⟨gi,1, gi,2, . . . , gi,n⟩. Note : |Gi| = n, thus,
|P6| = n× (n− k).
7. P7 is the concatenation of the sequences ⟨UR(c¯i),UA(ci),UR(di),UA(d¯i),UA(bi), UR(ci),UA(c¯i)⟩ for vi ∈ V − C . Note:
|P7| = 7n− 7k.
8. P8 is the concatenation of the sequences ⟨UR(vi)⟩ for vi ∈ V − C . Note: |P8| = n− k.
9. P9 is the concatenation of the sequences ⟨UA(ei)⟩where vi ∈ V . Note: |P9| = n.
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The order of P1 and P2 can be switched. From the definition of the can_assign relation for the roles hi,j, it follows that for
every vi ∈ C , the sequence of actions UA(Hi) can be executed in a state where ∀vm ∈ V −C : (vi, vm) ∉ E is true. This means
that UA(Hi) for all vi ∈ C can be executed in a state where every vm ∈ V − C is true. The sequence of actions UA(Gi) can be
executed from any state. Thus, P4 is a feasible subsequence of P . Finally, ei are added to the plan for all vi ∈ V , signaling the
end of the plan. It is straightforward to verify that P is indeed a plan for I and |P| = n2 + 13n− k.  Lemma 25
Lemma 26. Suppose there exists a plan for I of length n2 + 13n− k or less. Then G has a clique of size k.
Proof. Let P be a plan for I such that |P| ≤ n2 + 13n− k.
For all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, P must contain UA(ei) and also, based on UA and the preconditions in the can_assign rules, either
⟨UR(ci), . . . ,UA(c¯i), . . . ,UA(ai), . . . ,UR(c¯i), . . . ,UA(Gi),UA(ci), . . . ,UR(di), . . . ,
UA(d¯i), . . . ,UA(bi), . . . ,UR(ci), . . . ,UA(c¯i)⟩ (1)
or
⟨UR(di), . . . ,UA(d¯i), . . . ,UA(bi), . . . ,UR(d¯i), . . . ,UA(Hi),UA(di), . . . ,UR(ci), . . . ,
UA(c¯i), . . . ,UA(ai), . . . ,UR(di), . . . ,UA(d¯i)⟩. (2)
LetW be the set of vertices vi such that P contains UA(vi). P must also contain UR(vi) in order to add ei.
For vt ∈ V − W , P does not contain UA(vt), so the precondition for UA(ct) in the sequence (1) is never satisfied, so P
contains the sequence (2).
Let vs ∈ V −W . If there is no edge between vs and vt (i.e., (vs, vt) /∈ E), then from the definition of can_assign, vs is in
the precondition of UA(Ht). Since UA(Ht) ∈ P , it follows that UA(vs) ∈ P contradicting that vs ∈ V −W . Thus, there is an
edge (vs, vt) ∈ E. Since this is true for all vs and vt in V −W , V −W is a clique.
The length of each sequence of the form (1) is 10+ |V |, because |UA(ci)| = |UA(di)| = |UA(ci)| = |UA(di)| = |UA(ai)| =
|UA(bi)| = |UR(ci)| = |UR(di)| = |UR(ci)| = |UR(di)| = 1 and |UA(Gi)| = |V |.
The length of each sequence of the form (2) is 10 + (|V | + 1), because |UA(ci)| = |UA(di)| = |UA(ci)| = |UA(di)| =
|UA(ai)| = |UA(bi)| = |UR(ci)| = |UR(di)| = |UR(ci)| = |UR(di)| = 1 and |UA(Hi)| = |V | + 1.
Let p denote the sum of the lengths of the above sequences that appear in P . P contains a sequence of type (2) for each
vertex in V −W , and a sequence of type (1) or (2) for each vertex inW . To obtain a lower bound on |P|, we suppose that P
contains the shorter of these two kinds of sequences (namely, the former) for each vertex inW .
Therefore, the sum of the lengths of these sequences in P is (10+ |V |)|W | + (10+ |V | + 1)|V −W |. P must also contain
a UA(ei) for each vertex in V , and |UA(vi)| and |UR(vi)| for each vertex inW , so |P| ≥ (10+ |V |)|W | + (10+ |V | + 1)|V −
W | + |V | + 2|W |. The right side can be simplified to (recall that n = |V |) n2 + 12n + |W |, which can be rewritten as
n2 + 13n− (n− |W |), which equals n2 + 13n− |V −W |. Thus, we have |P| ≥ n2 + 13n− |V −W |.
By assumption, |P| ≤ n2+13n−k. Combining these two inequalities, we have n2+13n−|V −W | ≤ |P| ≤ n2+13n−k,
so |V −W | ≥ k. Thus, G contains a clique of size k.  Lemma 26
From Lemmas 25 and 26 it follows that BRE for the class [D, CR, EN, |ppre| ≤ 2, |SMER(r)| ≤ 1] is NP-hard.  Lemma 24
Theorem 27. Bounded Reachability (BRE) for the problem class [D, CR, EN, |pre| ≤ 2, |SMER(r)| ≤ 1] is NP-hard.
Proof. The proof is very similar to that of Lemma 24. The theorem can be easily proven by replacing the can_assign rules for
vi and ci with the following rules:
• ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n : (gi,n, vi) ∈ can_assign
• ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n : (vi, ci) ∈ can_assign 
Theorem 28. Bounded Reachability (BRE) for the problem class [D, EN, CR, |goal| = 1, |SMER(r)| ≤ 1] is NP-hard.
Proof. As discussed in Section 4, reachability of a goal containing multiple roles can be transformed to reachability of a
singleton goal, and the transformation preserves all restrictions except |pre| ≤ k and |ppre| ≤ k. Therefore, the proof of
Lemma 24 can directly be applied to show that reachability for the problem class [D, EN, CR, |goal| = 1, |SMER(r)| ≤ 1] is
NP-hard. 
Theorem 29. Bounded Reachability (BRE) for the problem class [D, EN, |ppre| ≤ 1] (no disjunction, SMER constraints allowed
but no explicit negation, at most one positive literal in preconditions) is NP-hard.
Proof. The proof is by reduction from the CLIQUE problem, which is known to be NP-complete [22]. The proof is similar
in structure to the proof of Theorem 4.15 in [7], but our construction and proof are significantly more complicated, because
we are dealing with a significantly more restricted problem class. Given a graph G = (V , E) where V = {v1, . . . , vn} and
an integer k, we construct a reachability problem instance I that is in the problem class [D, EN, |ppre| ≤ 1] and show that G
has a clique of size k if and only if I has a plan of size at most 15n− 2k.
Define I = (γ , goal, ψ)where
1. γ = (R,UA). Corresponding to each vertex vi ∈ V there is a role vi ∈ R, and for each such role vi there are additional
roles ai, bi, ci, di, ei, fi, gi, hi. Thus R = {vi, ai, bi, ci, di, ei, fi, gi, hi : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, and UA = {ci, di : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
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2. ψ = (can_assign, can_revoke, SMER)where
• can_assign is defined as
(a) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n : (true, vi) ∈ can_assign
(b) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n : (di, ai) ∈ can_assign
(c) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n : (ci, bi) ∈ can_assign
(d) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n : (true, ci) ∈ can_assign
(e) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n : (true, di) ∈ can_assign
(f) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n : (ai, ei) ∈ can_assign
(g) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n : (bi, fi) ∈ can_assign
(h) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n : (true, gi) ∈ can_assign
(i) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n : (true, hi) ∈ can_assign• can_revoke is defined as
(a) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n : (true, vi) ∈ can_revoke
(b) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n : (vi, ai) ∈ can_revoke
(c) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n : (vi, bi) ∈ can_revoke
(d) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n : (true, ci) ∈ can_revoke
(e) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n : (true, di) ∈ can_revoke• SMER is defined as
(a) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n : (di, bi) ∈ SMER
(b) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n : (ai, ci), (vi, ci) ∈ SMER
(c) ∀1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, (vi, vj) /∈ E : (di, vj) ∈ SMER
(d) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, (ai, gi) ∈ SMER
(e) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, (bi, hi) ∈ SMER
3. goal = {vi, ei, fi, gi, hi : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
Note that all the roles have positive preconditions of size at most 1, Thus, I satisfies the |ppre| ≤ 1 restriction. Because
each role r ∈ R has at most one state change rule in can_assign and can_revoke, I satisfies the D restriction. Because negation
is specified only as SMER constraints, I satisfies the EN restriction. Thus, I is in the problem class [D, EN, |ppre| ≤ 1].
Lemma 30. If G has a clique of size k, then I has a plan of size 15n− 2k.
Proof. Let C be a clique in G of size k. Consider the sequence of actions
P = P1.P2.P3.P4.P5.P6.P7.P8, P9.P10.P11.P12.P13.P14 where UA and UR abbreviate UserAssign and UserRevoke respectively.
1. P1 is the concatenation of the sequences ⟨UR(ci),UA(ai),UA(ei)⟩where vi ∈ V − C . |P1| = 3n− 3k.
2. P2 is the concatenation of the sequences ⟨UR(di),UA(bi),UA(fi)⟩where vi ∈ C . |P2| = 3k.
3. P3 is the concatenation of the sequences ⟨UR(di)⟩where vi ∈ V − C . |P3| = n− k.
4. P4 is the concatenation of the sequences ⟨UR(ci)⟩where vi ∈ C . |P4| = k.
5. P5 is the concatenation of the sequences ⟨UA(vi)⟩ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. |P5| = n.
6. P6 is the concatenation of the sequences ⟨UR(ai)⟩where vi ∈ V − C . |P6| = n− k.
7. P7 is the concatenation of the sequences ⟨UR(bi)⟩where vi ∈ C . |P7| = k.
8. P8 is the concatenation of the sequences ⟨UR(vi)⟩where vi ∈ V − C . |P8| = n− k.
9. P9 is the concatenation of the sequences ⟨UA(ci),UA(bi),UA(fi),UR(ci)⟩where vi ∈ V − C . |P9| = 4n− 4k.
10. P10 is the concatenation of the sequences ⟨UA(di),UA(ai),UA(ei),UR(di)⟩where vi ∈ C . |P10| = 4k.
11. P11 is the concatenation of the sequences ⟨UA(vi)⟩where vi ∈ V − C . |P11| = n− k.
12. P12 is the concatenation of the sequences ⟨UR(ai)⟩where vi ∈ C . |P12| = k.
13. P13 is the concatenation of the sequences ⟨UR(bi)⟩where vi ∈ V − C . |P13| = n− k.
14. P14 is the concatenation of the sequences ⟨UA(gi)UA(hi)⟩where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. |P14| = 2n.
It is easy to see that P is a plan for I and that |P| = 15n− 2k.  Lemma 30
Lemma 31. Suppose I has a plan of length at most 15n− 2k. Then G has a clique of size k.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 26.  Lemma 31
From Lemmas 30 and 31 it follows that G has a clique of size k if and only if I has a plan of size at most 15n − 2k. Thus,
BRE for [D, EN, |ppre| ≤ 1] is NP-hard.  Theorem 29
6. Other analysis problems
6.1. Reachability, availability, and containment analysis problems
In this section, we consider the following analysis problems: permission-role and user-permission reachability, user-role
availability, role–role containment, and permission-role containment.
Permission-Role Reachability Analysis. Consider queries of the form ‘‘Can administrators in administrative roles in A assign a
permission p to all roles in goal?’’. miniRBAC andminiARBAC specifications for the user-role and permission-role assignment
relations are symmetrical, except that miniARBAC does not include an analogue of SMER constraints forpermissions, so
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permission-role reachability analysis can be performed in exactly the same manner as user-role reachability analysis with
SMER = ∅. Thus, the results of Section 5 apply directly.
We now consider a more general case: ‘‘Can administrators in administrative roles in A assign permissions {p1, . . . , pn}
to all roles in goal?’’. Note that role assignments for different permissions are independent, just as role assignments for
different users are independent (cf. the Single User simplification in Section 4.1). Thus, this analysis problem is true if and
only if the administrators in administrative roles in A can assign every permission pi to all roles in goal. All complexity
results for permission-role reachability analysis with single permission carry over to permission-role reachability analysis
with multiple permissions.
User-Permission Reachability Analysis. Consider queries of the form ‘‘Can administrators in administrative roles in A grant
user u permission p?’’. Such a query can be answered by checking whether there exists a role r such that (1) user u is initially
a member of r or the administrators can add u to r , and (2) permission p is already granted to r or administrators can
grant p to r . Thus, the problem can be transformed into a polynomial number of user-role and permission-role reachability
analysis problems that satisfy the same structural restrictions (N , D, etc.) as the original problem. This implies that results in
Section 5 showing user-role reachability for a problem class is in P, NP, or PSPACE also apply to user-permission reachability
(for a single permission) for that problem class. To show that the NP-hardness and PSPACE-hardness results in Section 5
also carry over, we sketch a polynomial-time reduction from permission-role reachability analysis to user-permission
reachability analysis (for a single permission). Recall from above that complexity results for user-role reachability carry over
to permission-role reachability. Given a permission-role reachability query involving permission p, role r , and administrative
roles in A, we add a new user u0 to the policy, make u0 a member of role r in the initial state, delete all the can_assign and
can_revoke rules (keeping the can_assign_p and can_revoke_p rules unchanged), and askwhether permission p can be granted
to user u0 by administrators in roles in A. u0 is always a member of r and of no other roles, so p can be granted to u0 iff p can
be granted to r .
We now consider a more general user-permission query with multiple permissions: ‘‘Can administrators in A give user
u permissions {p1, . . . , pn}?’’. To solve this problem, we first perform permission-role reachability analysis to compute, for
i = 1..n, the set Ri of roles that can be granted permission pi by administrators in A. Next, we perform user-role reachability
analysis to check if there exist g1 ∈ R1, . . . , gn ∈ Rn such that u can be assigned all roles in {g1, . . . , gn}. The given set
of permissions is reachable iff such g1, . . . , gn exist. Note that role assignments for different permissions are independent,
just as role assignments for different users are independent (cf. the Single User simplification in Section 4.1), so each gi
can be selected independently from Ri. Thus, user-permission reachability analysis for n permissions can be transformed
into O(|R| × n) permission-role reachability analysis problems and O(|R|n) user-role reachability analysis problems that
satisfy the same structural restrictions as the original problem. It follows that the PSPACE-completeness result for user-role
reachability in Section 5 carries over to user-permission reachability with multiple permissions.
Availability Analysis. User-role availability analysis checks whether a given user u is amember of a given role r in all policies
reachable from the initial policy by actions of a given set of administrators A. The problem can be simplified in the same
ways as user-role reachability (cf. Section 4.1). A simplified user-role availability analysis problem instance has the form
I = (γ , goal, ψ) where γ = (R,UA) is a simplified miniRBAC policy, ψ = (can_assign, can_revoke, SMER) is a simplified
miniARBAC policy, and goal is a set of roles. The answer to I is true iff in every state γ ′ reachable from γ via ψ (i.e.,
γ →∗ψ γ ′), the user is a member of at least one role in goal in state γ ′. I can be solved as follows.
1. Suppose goal ∩ UA = ∅; i.e., no role in goal is in the initial state. Then the answer is false.
2. Suppose ψ satisfies the CR restriction (every role can be unconditionally revoked). The answer is false, because u’s
membership in every role in goal can be revoked.
3. Otherwisewe transform the user-role availability analysis problem instance I to a user-role reachability analysis problem
instance I ′ = (γ ′, goal′, ψ ′) as follows.
• goal′ = {r¯ : r ∈ goal}where each r¯ is a new role.
• Let γ ′ = (R′,UA)where R′ = R ∪ goal′.
• ψ ′ =(can_assign′, can_revoke′, SMER′)where
(1) can_assign′ = can_assign ∪{(true, r¯) : r¯ ∈ goal′},
(2) can_revoke′ = can_revoke ∪{(true, r¯) : r¯ ∈ goal′}, and
(3) SMER′ = SMER ∪ {(r, r¯) : r ∈ goal}.
We show that I and I ′ have opposite answers. Suppose the answer to I ′ is true. Then there exists a state γ ′ = (R,UA′)
such that γ →∗
ψ ′ γ
′ and goal′ ⊆ UA′. For each r ∈ goal, (r¯, r) ∈ SMER′, so r /∈ γ ′. Thus, goal ∩ γ ′ = ∅. This implies that
the answer to I is false. Conversely, it is easy to show that if the answer to I ′ is false, then the answer to I is true. Thus,
availability analysis can be reduced to reachability analysis in polynomial time, and the transformation preserves restrictions
EN, CR,D, |goal| ≤ k, |pre| ≤ k, and |ppre| ≤ k. Thus, several of the complexity results and algorithms in Section 5 carry
over to availability analysis. For example, availability analysis for the problem classes [CR, EN, |ppre| ≤ 1, |goal| ≤ k] and
[|pre| ≤ 1, |goal| ≤ k] are in P.
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Containment Analysis. A role–role containment problem instance has the form [26]: given a set A of administrative roles,
an initial miniRBAC policy γ , and miniARBAC policy ψ , is every member of role r1 also a member of role r2 in every state
reachable from γ by actions of administrators in A allowed byψ? Let Ic = (γ , A, r1, r2, ψ) denote this role–role containment
analysis instance.
Theorem 32. Role–role containment analysis for the problem class without any restrictions is PSPACE-complete.
Proof. Recall from Theorem 2 that RE for the problem class without any restrictions is PSPACE-hard. We give a polynomial-
time reduction from reachability analysis to role–role containment analysis; this implies that role–role containment analysis
is also PSPACE-hard. Given a (simplified) reachability problem instance I = (γ , {g1, . . . , gn}, ψ), we first transform it to a
reachability problem instance with a singleton goal {g}, as described in Section 4. Let I1 = (γ1, {g}, ψ1) denote the resulting
reachability problem instance. Next, we transform I1 to a role–role containment analysis problem Ic = (γ2, g, r2, ψ2),
where r2 is a new role, γ2 is obtained from γ1 by adding r2 to the set of roles (but not the user-role assignment), and γ2
and ψ2 are ‘‘unsimplified’’ (cf. the simplifications in Section 4.1) by adding dummy values for the implicit user, the implicit
administrative role, and the relations related to permissions. Note that r2 is unreachable, because r2 is not in the initial user-
role assignment in γ2, and there are no can_assign rules for r2. Based on this, it is easy to see that the answer to the original
reachability problem instance I is true iff the answer to Ic is false.
We show that role–role containment analysis is in PSPACE, by showing that it is in co-NPSPACE, and recalling that PSPACE
= co-NPSPACE (this is a corollary of Savitch’s theorem). Role–role containment analysis is in co-NPSPACE, because a non-
deterministic TuringMachine can show that the answer to a role–role containment problem instance Ic = (γ , A, r1, r2, ψ) is
false by guessing, one step at a time, a plan that leads to aminiRBAC state that contains r1 but not r2. At each step, the Turing
Machine stores only the current state (i.e., current miniRBAC policy), whose size is polynomial in the size of the problem
instance. 
Theorem 33. Role–role containment analysis for the problem class [R] is co-NP-complete.
Proof. Recall that a language is co-NP-complete if its complement is NP-complete, sowe need to show that the complement
of role–role containment analysis for [R] is NP-complete. It is NP-hard because reachability analysis for [R] is many-one
reducible to it, using the same reduction as in the first half of the proof of Theorem 32, and reachability analysis for [R]
is NP-hard, according to Theorem 17. It is in NP by the same reasoning as in the second half of the proof of Theorem 32,
together with the observation that guessing and checking the plan can be done polynomial time, because in the absence of
revocation, the length of the plan is bounded by the number of roles, because the plan contains only UserAssign actions, and
repeating a UserAssign action has no effect. 
A permission-role containment problem instance has the form: in every state reachable from the initial state, is every
principal who has permission p also a member of at least one role in Role? An example is: is every user with permission
[assignGrade,GradeBook] a member of TA or Faculty? The permission-role containment analysis problem can be reduced
to the negation of the following problem instance: does there exist a state, a user u and a role r ∉ Role such that u is a
member of r and r has permission p? This problem can be transformed into a polynomial number of user-role reachability
and role-permission reachability analysis problems by first computing a set of roles R1 to which an administrator can grant
p and then checking if there exist a role r ∈ (R1 − Role) and a user u such that r is reachable from {r1|(u, r1) ∈ UA}. If
so, the containment analysis result is false and true otherwise. The above reduction does not change the policy. Thus the
permission-role containment problem is in P for policies where can_assign and can_assignp each satisfy the restrictions
defining one of the problem classes (in Fig. 2) for which user-role reachability is in P.
Role-permission and permission–permission containment analysis problems are not common in practice and hence are
not considered in this paper.
6.2. Information flow analysis of miniARBAC
An information flow analysis query asks: given a miniRBAC policy γ , a miniARBAC policy ψ , a set A of administrative
roles, and objects (i.e., resources) o1 and o2, can information flow from o1 to o2 by administrative actions of administrators
in roles in A and normal actions of all users?
Our solution to this analysis problem builds on Osborn’s definition of an information flow graph for an RBAC policy γ [29].
Each node in the graph represents an object. There is an edge o1 → o2 in the graph if information can flow directly from
object o1 to object o2, i.e., if there exists a user u that has permission in γ to read from o1 and write to o2. For simplicity,
we assume the only operations on objects are read and write; other permissions can be represented as read and write
permissions for the purposes of information flow analysis. Note that [29] considers only RBAC, not ARBAC.
Our algorithm constructs a graph called the information flow transition graph. Each state in the graph is a pair (γ ,O)where
γ is an RBAC policy and O is a set of objects; the state means that the system can reach a state in which the miniRBAC policy
is γ and information has flowed from o1 to the objects in O.
The graph contains a labeled edge (transition) (γ1,O1)
α
↩→ (γ2,O2), where α is an administrative action permitted by ψ
for an administrative role in A, if γ2 is obtained from γ1 by execution of α, and O2 is the set of objects reachable from O1 in
the information flow graph for γ2. Our algorithm starts from (γ ,O), where O is the set of objects reachable from o1 in the
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information flow graph for the initial miniRBAC policy γ , and computes the reachable states. The answer to the information
flow query is true iff there exists a reachable state whose second component contains o2. As an optimization, it is sufficient
to consider only users with distinct sets of roles in the initial miniRBAC policy.
The following theorems establish the complexity of information flow analysis for miniARBAC for some problem classes.
Theorem 34. Information flow analysis for miniARBAC without any restrictions is PSPACE-complete.
Proof. Recall that user-role reachability analysis of ARBAC without any restrictions is PSPACE-complete (Theorem 2).
Below, we show that information flow analysis for the problem class without any restriction is PSPACE-hard by giving a
polynomial-time reduction from user-role reachability analysis to information flow analysis. Given a user-role reachability
problem instance, we first transform it to a user-role reachability problem instance with a singleton goal {g}, as described in
Section 4. We then introduce two new objects o1 and o2, and modify the initial permission-role assignment to grant to role
g permissions to read from o1 and write to o2. Note that no users are members of role g in the initial user-role assignment.
It is easy to see that information can flow from o1 to o2 iff role g is reachable.
Information flow analysis of miniARBAC is in PSPACE by similar reasoning as in the proof that user-role reachability
analysis is in PSPACE (Theorem 2). The main point is that a non-deterministic Turing Machine can guess a path in the
information flow transition graph, one step at a time, storing only the current state (node) after each step. The size of each
node is polynomial in the size of the problem instance. 
Theorem 35. Information flow analysis for the problem class [N] can be solved in polynomial time.
Proof. We describe a simple polynomial algorithm to solve the problem, based on the observation that, without negative
preconditions, revocation is not useful for achieving any information flow goal. First, the algorithm computes the maximal
set of roles that can be assigned to each user, by starting from the initial RBAC policy and repeatedly assigning roles until
no more roles can be assigned. Next, the algorithm in [29] is used to construct an information flow graph G based on these
sets of roles. The information flow analysis problem is true if and only if there exists a path from the given source object o1
to the given target object o2 in G. 
Theorem 36. Information flow analysis problem for the problem classes [R], [R, EN], and [R, EN, |goal| = 1, |SMER(r)| ≤ 1] is
NP-complete.
Proof. NP-hardness of information flow analysis for these problem classes is proved from NP-hardness of user-role
reachability analysis for these problem classes (see Theorem 17), using the same reduction as in the proof of Theorem 34.
That reduction preserves the restrictions R, EN, |goal| = 1, and |SMER(r)| ≤ 1. The problem is inNP because, after guessing a
sequence P ofUserAssign(ri) actions, a TuringMachine can check in polynomial timewhether P is allowed by theminiARBAC
policy andwhether P allows information to flow from a given source object to a given target object. It is sufficient to consider
polynomial-length sequences P , because without revocation, it is sufficient to add each role at most once. 
7. Extensions
In this section, we consider user-role reachability analysis for two extensions of miniARBAC. The first extension allows
role hierarchy, and the second extension allows a role to be both a regular role and an administrative role.
7.1. User-role reachability analysis in hierarchical RBAC
In this subsection, we first discuss reachability analysis for miniARBAC controlling changes to miniHRBAC policies with
fixed role hierarchy, and then consider changes to the role hierarchy. Fixed role hierarchymeans that the can_modify relation
is empty, so the role hierarchy does not change.
Reachability analysis with fixed role hierarchy. It is easy to show, based on our results for non-hierarchical policies, that
reachability analysis for miniARBAC with fixed role hierarchy is PSPACE-hard.
Theorem 37. For miniARBAC policies controlling changes to miniHRBAC policies with fixed role hierarchy (i.e., the can_modify
relation is empty), Reachability (RE) is PSPACE-complete.
Proof. PSPACE-hardness of RE for this problem class is a corollary of Theorem 2, because miniRBAC is a restricted case of
miniHRBACwith a fixed role hierarchy. Reachability for this problem class is in PSPACE by similar reasoning as in Theorem2:
a non-deterministic Turing Machine can guess a plan one step at a time, storing at each step only the current state. 
To extend other complexity results from the non-hierarchical case to the hierarchical case, we show how to transform
reachability analysis problems for hierarchical policies into reachability analysis problems for non-hierarchical policies.
The transformation makes the effects of inherited membership explicit; in the original problem, the effects of inherited
membership are implicit in the semantics of preconditions.
Our transformation assumes that the SMER constraints do not conflict with the role hierarchy. Two kinds of conflicts are
identified in [1]. A SMER constraint (r1, r2) conflicts with the role hierarchy if (1) r1 and r2 have a common senior role, or
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(2) r1 is senior to r2 or vice versa. For example, consider a policy in which Manager is senior to Employee1 and Employee2.
The SMER constraint (Employee1, Employee2) contains a conflict of type (1); intuitively, this reflects the fact that this SMER
constraint forces Manager to be empty, because any member of Manager would be an implicit member of both Employee1
and Employee2. The SMER constraint (Employee1,Manager) contains a conflict of type (2); this reflects the fact that it also
forcesManager to be empty, for similar reasons.
Let Ih = (γh, goalh, ψh)be a reachability problem instance for hierarchical RBACwithγh = (R,UA,≽),ψh = (can_assignh,
can_revokeh, SMERh), and goalh = {g1, g2, . . . , gk}. Define a set of reachability problem instances for non-hierarchical RBAC
as follows.
• Let γ = (R,UA).
• The can_assign and can_revoke relations are generated in two steps from can_assignh and can_revokeh.
1. For each (c, r) ∈ can_assignh, and for each¬t ∈ c , replace¬t withs∈Senior(t) ¬s. Transform the can_revokeh relation
in a similar manner. Let can_assign′ and can_revoke′ denote the transformed relations.
2. For each (c+ ∧ c−, r) ∈ can_assign′, where c+ is a conjunction r1 ∧ · · · ∧ rk of positive roles, and c− is a conjunction
of negative roles, generate the Cartesian product PosConjunct = Senior(r1)× · · · × Senior(rk). For each (r ′1, . . . , r ′k) ∈
PosConjunct such that there is no role that appears in both (r ′1, . . . , r
′
k) and c
−, add the rule (r ′1 ∧ · · · ∧ r ′k ∧ c−, r) to
can_assign. Generate can_revoke from the can_revoke′ in the same manner.
• Let SMER = {(r, s) : (r ′, s′) ∈ SMERh ∧ r ≽ r ′ ∧ s ≽ s′}.
• Goals = Senior(g1)× Senior(g2)× · · · × Senior(gn).
Note that transforming the goal {g1, . . . , gn} into Goals ensures that if a role senior to gi is reachable, then gi is reachable.
As a result, we do not need to transform the postconditions in can_assign and can_revoke rules. The answer to Ih is true if
and only if there exists a goal ∈ Goals such that the answer to I = (γ , goal, ψ) is true. Moreover, it is easy to show that
any plan for Ih is also a plan for I , and vice versa.
Starting from our results for analysis of non-hierarchical policies, we can derive results for analysis of a class of
hierarchical policies, defined by some restrictions on the policies, by determining (1) the restrictions satisfied by the
transformed policies, (2) the size of a transformed policy relative to the size of the original (hierarchical) policy, and (3)
the number of transformed problem instances, i.e., the number of transformed goals. We consider these issues in turn.
The restrictions N , EN , R, CR, |ppre| ≤ 1, and |goal| ≤ k are preserved by the transformation; the proofs are
straightforward. The transformation may invalidate other restrictions. Specifically, steps 1 and 2 in the transformation may
invalidate the restrictions |pre| ≤ 1 and D, respectively, and the transformation from SMERh to SMER may invalidate the
|SMER(r)| ≤ 1 restriction.
The size of the transformed policymight not be polynomial in the size of the original policy because, in theworst case, the
Cartesian product Senior(r1)× · · · × Senior(rk) in step 2 may result in addition of O(h|ppre|) rules, where h is a bound on the
number of senior roles for each role, and |ppre| is a bound on the number of positive preconditions in each can_assign rule.
Therefore, in general, the transformation may increase the size of the policy by a factor exponential in |ppre|. This implies,
for example, that results giving polynomial-time algorithms for a problem class do not carry over to analysis of hierarchical
policies, unless |ppre| is bounded. We do expect that in practice, the number of positive preconditions in each can_assign
rule is bounded by a small constant.
The transformed goals are defined by a Cartesian product Senior(g1)×Senior(g2)×· · ·×Senior(gn). In theworst case, the
number of transformed goals is O(h|goal|), where h is as in the previous paragraph. For problem classes with the restriction
|goal| ≤ k, the number of transformed goals is polynomial in the size of the original policy.
For example, recall that reachability analysis for the problem class [EN, CR, |ppre| ≤ 1, |goal| ≤ k] for non-hierarchical
policies can be solved in polynomial time. Based on the above observations, we conclude that reachability analysis for the
problem class [EN, CR, |ppre| ≤ 1, |goal| ≤ k] for hierarchical policies can also be solved in polynomial time.
As an optimization, we can compute dependencies between roles (based on preconditions) and transform only the part
of the role hierarchy relevant to the goal.
Analysis for some classes of hierarchical policies can be solved more efficiently by a direct algorithm than by the above
transformation. For example, reachability analysis for hierarchical policies that satisfy theN restriction can always be solved
in polynomial time, using a fixed-point algorithm similar to the algorithm for reachability analysis for non-hierarchical
policies satisfying this restriction.
Reachability allowing changes to role hierarchy. Next, we show that user-role reachability analysis is PSPACE-completewhen
changes to the role hierarchy are allowed. Recall from Section 3 that changes to the role hierarchy ≽ are controlled by the
RRA policy (note that the administrative role hierarchy ≽a is fixed). When considering changes to the role hierarchy, we
also adopt a modified definition of URA and PRA in which the third component of each tuple in can_assign, can_revoke,
can_assign_p, and can_revoke_p is a set of roles expressed using range notation, like in the second component of can_modify.
We refer to this modified version as miniARBAC with role ranges. Actually, this matches the original definition of ARBAC97
[32]. Our use of a single role in the third component of those relations in other sections of this paper is a simplification that
has essentially no effect on our results when the role hierarchy is fixed, but it would have an effect here. When new roles
may be added, use of range notation is significant, because it allows existing tuples in can_assign, can_revoke, etc., to apply
to newly added roles that fall in the specified range.
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Theorem 38. When changes to the role hierarchy are allowed, user-role reachability analysis for miniARBAC with role ranges is
PSPACE-complete.
Proof. PSPACE-hardness of this problem is a corollary of Theorem 2. The proof that the problem is in PSPACE relies on the
following lemma.
Lemma 39. Let R be the set of roles in a miniRBAC policy γ , and let r be a role in R. If r is reachable from γ under a miniARBAC
policy ψ , then r is reachable from γ by a plan that adds at most |R|2 roles.
Proof. A new role is related to roles in R only by the specification of its parent and child in the role hierarchy, and there are
at most |R|2 distinct choices for these among roles in R. Creating additional roles with the same parent and child in R has
no additional effect on inheritance relationships between (or membership of) roles in R. Creating multiple roles between
roles r1 and r2 in R (e.g., creating r and r ′ with r2 ≻ r ′ ≻ r ≻ r1) is always unnecessary for reaching a role membership
goal, because the same inheritance relationship between r1 and r2 can be produced by creating a single role between
them.  Lemma 39
To see that the problem is in PSPACE, note that a non-deterministic Turing Machine can guess a plan one step at a time,
storing at each step only the current state. The size of the state is polynomial in the number of roles. Based on Lemma 39,
the non-deterministic Turing machine guesses only plans that add at most a quadratic number of roles, so the number of
roles (and hence the size of the state) is polynomial in the size of the problem instance.  Theorem 38
7.2. Beyond the separate administration restriction
miniARBAC, like ARBAC97, requires that administrative roles and regular roles are separate, i.e., AR ∩ R = ∅. We call
this requirement the separate administration restriction. In this subsection, we consider user-role reachability analysis for a
variant of miniARBAC without this restriction. In this subsection, we do not consider hierarchical RBAC (in other words, the
miniARBAC policies control changes to miniRBAC policies not miniHRBAC policies), and we do not consider changes to the
role hierarchy (i.e., we assume can_modify is empty).
Without the separate administration restriction, reachability analysis must consider plans that may contain
administrative actions that change the role membership of any user. Consider the following ARBAC policy: can_assign
= {(ra1, true, ra2), (ra2, true, r)}. Let UA = ∅, goal = {r}, and ut be the target user. Observe from the policy that, a user
with administrative role ra1 cannot directly assign role r to ut , but ua can assign him/herself to ra2 and then assign role r to
ut . Thus, we cannot assume ‘‘single user’’ and ‘‘implicit administrative role’’ (cf. Section 4.1) in this context.
Theorem 40. Reachability (RE) for miniARBAC without the separate administration restriction is PSPACE-complete.
Proof. PSPACE-hardness of reachability for this problem class is a corollary of Theorem 2. Reachability for this problem class
is in PSPACE, because a non-deterministic Turing Machine can guess a plan one step at a time, storing at each step only the
current state. The size of the state is polynomial in the numbers of users and roles, which do not grow, so the size of the
state is polynomial in the size of the problem instance. 
8. Related work
We classify related work on security policy analysis into three categories, which focus on different and complementary
analysis problems.
The first category is analysis (including enforcement) of a fixed security policy. We mention some representative papers
in this category. Jajodia, Samarati, and Subrahmanian [19] propose a policy language that can express positive and negative
authorizations and derived authorizations (similar to delegation), and they give polynomial-time algorithms to check
consistency and completeness of a given policy. Cholvy and Cuppens [9] use SOL-deduction to check consistency of a security
policy that expresses positive and negative permissions and obligations. Bandara, Lupu, and Russo [6] use abductive logic
programming to detect conflicts in a policy expressed in a language based on Event Calculus that can express positive
and negative authorizations, obligations, and refrain conditions. Jaeger et al. [16,21] give algorithms to check integrity and
completeness of a Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) policy. Guttman et al. [13] describe a technique to analyze information
flow in a SELinux policy.
The second category is analysis of a single change to a fixed policy or, similarly, analysis of the differences between two
fixed policies. Jha and Reps [18] present analysis algorithms, based on push-down model checking, to check properties of a
given SPKI/SDSI policy and to analyze the effects of a given change to a given policy. Fisler et al. [12] consider policy analysis
for a subset of XACML. They give decision-diagram-based algorithms to check properties of a given policy and to compute
the semantic difference of two given policies and check properties of the difference.
Work in the first two categories differs significantly from our work (and other work in the third category) by not
considering the effect of sequences of changes to the policy.
The third category is analysis that considers the effect of sequences of changes to a policy; the allowed changes are
determined by parts of the policy that we call ‘‘administrative policy’’. Harrison et al. [15] present an access control model
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based on accessmatrices, which can express administrative policy, and show that the safety analysis problem is undecidable
for that model. Following this, a number of access control systems were designed in which safety analysis is more tractable,
e.g., [25,30,31]. While each of these papers proposes a specific model designedwith tractable analysis inmind, we start with
the ARBAC97model [32] and explore the difficulty of policy analysis in a range ofmodels obtained by combinations of simple
restrictions on the policy language. Also,we consider features not considered in those papers, such as negative preconditions,
and we consider availability as well as safety (i.e., reachability). Guelev et al. [14] present a low-level access control model
and an algorithm to check properties of the policies; they note that the worst-case complexity of their algorithm is high and
non-optimal, and they leave identification of problem classes for which it has lower complexity as future work.
Schaad and Moffett [34] express RBAC and ARBAC97 in Alloy, a relational modeling language, and use the Alloy analyzer
[20] to check separation of duty properties. They do not consider preconditions for any operations; this greatly simplifies the
analysis problem. They do not present any analysis algorithms or complexity results. The Alloy analyzer translates bounded-
size problem instances into SAT problems, and solves them with a SAT solver.
Li and Tripunitara [26] introduce two restricted versions of ARBAC97, called AATU and AAR, and give algorithms and
complexity results for various analysis problems – primarily safety, availability, and containment – for those two models.
The results are based on Li,Mitchell, andWinsborough’s results for analysis of trustmanagement policies [24]. Ourwork goes
significantly beyond theirs by considering negative preconditions and SMER (Static Mutually Exclusive Role) constraints.
They do not consider these features. Since we consider these features, we are driven to consider other restrictions, such as
bounds on the size of preconditions, that they do not consider.
Jha et al. also studies reachability analysis of URA97 [17]. One difference is that we allow preconditions in the can_revoke
relation (Section 3 gives an example of a policy that requires conditional role revocation), and they do not; as a result, their
proof that reachability analysis for URA97 is PSPACE-hard is stronger than our PSPACE-hardness result, while our proof that
reachability analysis for URA97 with conditional role revocation is in PSPACE is stronger than their ‘‘in PSPACE’’ result. Also,
while they consider a few problem classes that we do not (for example, they show that reachability analysis for ARBACwith
no explicit negative preconditions is PSPACE-complete), we consider numerous problem classes not considered in [17].
Specifically, we consider restrictions on |SMER(r)|, |pre|, |ppre|, and |goal|, as well as the Polynomial-size Plan (EPP) and
Bounded Reachability (BRP) problems, while they do not. This implies that they do not prove the results in our Theorems 5,
6, 11, 12, 18, 19, 22 and 27–29. In addition, we consider reachability analysis without the separate administration restriction,
availability analysis, containment analysis, and information flow analysis, while they do not.
Stoller et al. [36] present two algorithms for reachability analysis of a variant of URA97, anduse parameterized complexity
theory to show that each algorithm is efficient for policies that may be large overall but are small with respect to certain
metrics. In contrast, in this paper, we consider a much wider range of problem classes defined by various restrictions rather
than metrics. Also, we consider availability analysis and information flow analysis, while [36] does not.
Sistla and Zhou [38], like [24], consider trust management policies changing in accordance with role restrictions that
indicate, for each role, whether arbitrary rules defining that role may be added, and whether they may be removed. The
administrative policies we consider are finer-grained than such role restrictions.
Munawer and Sandhu [28] shows that Augmented Typed Access Matrix Model (ATAM) can be simulated by appropriate
configuration of RBAC96 [33] components. The undecidability of reachability analysis of ATAM suggests that reachability
analysis for RBAC may be undecidable when a complicated administrative model (similar in expressiveness to ATAM) is
used.
Crampton showsundecidability of the safety problem– specifically, user-role reachability analysis – for RBAC96/ARBAC97
[10, Chapter 5]. However, Crampton’s definition of reachability is different than ours. Our definition is based closely on AR-
BAC: the transitions are exactly those permitted by a given ARBAC policy. In contrast, Crampton’s definition of reachability
is based on [15]: the transitions are exactly those obtained by executing a given set of commands, where a command consists
of a precondition and a sequence of administrative operations. The commands used in Crampton’s undecidability proof are
not expressible as ARBAC97 policies for several reasons: some of the preconditions of commands are not expressible in the
form allowed in URA and PRA policies in ARBAC97, some commands use administrative operations that change the ARBAC97
policy (specifically, the can_assign relation), and the commands define sequences of several administrative operations that
must be performed atomically. Therefore, Crampton’s undecidability result does not apply to reachability analysis as defined
in this paper.
This paper extends our workshop paper [37] in several ways. It provides detailed proofs of the results in [37]. It
adds results for reachability analysis when changes to role hierarchy are allowed and when the separate administration
restriction is removed (Section 7). It also adds results for several other analysis problems, namely, permission-role and user-
permission reachability for goals containingmultiple permissions, role–role containment, permission-role containment, and
information flow analysis (Section 6).
9. Conclusion
We considered the problem of analyzing the consequences of sequences of changes to RBAC policies that are allowed
by miniARBAC policies. We found that the general analysis problem is intractable, and remains so even when a number of
fairly strong syntactic restrictions are imposed on the ARBAC policies. For example, safety (reachability) analysis remains
NP-hard even when revocation of roles is not allowed. It also remains NP-hard even when each role assignment has at most
6234 A. Sasturkar et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 412 (2011) 6208–6234
one precondition. We identified a few combinations of syntactic restrictions under which safety analysis can be done in
polynomial time. More experience is needed to determine how often these restrictions are satisfied in practice. We expect
that the restrictions CR (all roles can be unconditionally revoked) and EN (negation is used only for specifying mutual
exclusion of roles, i.e., separation of duty) are satisfied reasonably often in practice. Other restrictions, such as the absence
of disjunction and restrictions on the number of preconditions, may be harder to satisfy in practice. We also expect that in
many cases, when one of these restrictions is violated, the policymostly satisfies the restriction, for example, only a few role
assignment rules have more than one precondition.
This work is a step toward a deeper understanding of policy analysis for ARBAC. An important direction for future
work is to study the effect of more global properties of the policy (as opposed to syntactic restrictions), for instance,
to determine whether the analysis problem becomes tractable when dependencies between roles are acyclic. Another
interesting direction for future work is to extend our results to trust management policies [4,23].
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